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Moving Beyond Cameras in the Courtroom:
Technology, the Media, and the Supreme Court
Mary-Rose Papandrea *
I. INTRODUCTION

News media, legal blogs, and law reviews routinely cite a panoply of
reasons why the Supreme Court will not permit the televising or
videotaping of oral arguments: the Justices' desire for anonymity, 1 the
risk that creative editing of sound bites will mislead the public, 2 the risk
that the Justices' questions and comments will be taken out of context, 3
the need to separate the judicial process from the political branches of
government, 4 a lack of confidence in the public's ability to understand
the proceedings, 5 and the concern that both the lawyers and the Justices
will grandstand for the cameras. 6 More cynical commentators believe
that the Justices are reluctant to be recorded on camera because of their
view that their branch is exceptional. 7 Others suggest that the Justices
"are simply not used to being second-guessed." 8
• Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. Thank you to Derek Bambauer,
Elizabeth Ludwin King, Joseph Liu, Emily Meazell, Rebecca Morrow, Ronald Wright, Fred Yen,
the Wake Forest Law School faculty, and all the participants at the BYU Law Review Symposium:
The Press, the Public, and the U.S. Supreme Court, for their helpful comments and feedback on the
contents of this Article. I am also grateful to Noah Hampson, Eric Lee, Jeff Locke, Ellen Melville,
and Andy Soliman for their research assistance.
I. Ariane de Vogue, What Do the Supreme Court Justices Think of Cameras in Court?,
ABC NEWS LEGAL BLOG (Dec. I, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
20 II I 12/what-do-the-supreme-court-justices-think-of-cameras-in-court.
2. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court TV? Nice Idea, but Still Not Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2011, at A 18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20 11 /11129/us/supreme-court-tv-still-not-likelysidebar.html.
3. Mark Memmott, Americans Want the Supreme Court to Open Up; Here's Why It Won't,
NPR
(Mar.
24,
2012,
6:00
AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/
20 12/03/24/ 149235724/americans-want-the-supreme-court-to-open-up-heres-why-it -wont.
4. Tony Mauro, Let the Cameras Roll: Cameras in the Court and the Myth of Supreme
Court Exceptiona/ism, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 259,270 (2011).
5. Liptak, supra note 2.
6. De Vogue, supra note I.
7. Mauro, supra note 4, at 259, 270-71 (arguing that the Court views itself as "a unique
institution that can and should resist the demands of the information age").
8. Adam Cohen, Why Won't the Supreme Court Allow TV Cameras?, TIME (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://ideas.time.com/20 II I 11/21 /why-won-the-supreme-court-allow-tv-cameras.
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Another common explanation is that the Supreme Court has resisted
modem communications technology because the Justices do not
understand new technology 9 and are indeed "hostile to [it]." 10 As the
Wall Street Journal Law Blog put it, "Maybe the justices are against
cameras in the court because when they think of cameras, they think of
those huge cameras on tripods with the cloth to cover the photographers
and the supernova flash-bulbs." 11 Indeed, Judge Posner recently wrote
that "the current justices have-though this is not new-a low comfort
level with science and technology, and with complex commercial
transactions, at a time when technology (including "financial
engineering") is playing an increasingly large role in culture and
society." 12
The goal of this Article is to examine the theory that the Court's
reluctance to embrace not just cameras but modem communications
technology more generally is based on the Justices' own lack of
understanding of and hostility to this technology. To accomplish this
goal, the Article considers the Justices' use of technology in their
personal and professional lives as well as their understanding of
communications technology in oral argument and written opinions. First,
the Article examines the Court's changing use of technology to
communicate with the press and public in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries as well as the various comments Justices have made in their
public remarks regarding their personal understanding and use of
technology. The Court has plainly been slow to embrace new

9. See Monica Bay, Cameras and Social Media in the Courts, L. TECH. NFWS (May 19,
20 II),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id= 120249447655
3
(summarizing comments from Manny Medrano, a litigator and legal analyst, who suggested that
having a "media savvy judge, who is not terrified of media" was one of three conditions required for
court proceedings to be televised properly); Carrie Dann, On ATMs, Tweets, and 'Twitting,'
NBCNEWS.COM
(May
21,
2010,
6:11
PM),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/
_news/20 I 0/05/21/4439641-on-atms-tweets-and-twitting (reporting that some of the Justices' recent
statements have done little to rebut the stereotype that they are "awed and confused by technology").
10. Nick Summers, Supreme Court Turns Technophile, DAILY BEAST (June 28,2011, 12:38
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/28/supreme-court-video-game-decision-is-raretech-savvy-ruling.html.
II. Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 5:56
PM), http://blogs. wsj .com/law/20 I 0/04/ 19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court.
12. Richard A. Posner, The Court of Celebrity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 20 II, at 26; see also
Monica Harrington, The Supreme Court Doesn't Understand Globalization, FAST CoMPANY (Jan.
20 I 0),
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/monica-harrington/social-innovation21,
perspectives/supreme-court-doesnt-understand-globalization ("The Supreme Court is made up of
justices who demonstrate no understanding of how profoundly the world has changed due to changes
in business, technology and communications.").
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communications technology, and the Justices' personal use of technology
is consistent with those in their respective peer groups. Second, the
Article examines the Court's understanding of communications
technology as reflected in its oral arguments and written decisions in the
last two decades. 13 This section concludes that the Court's resistance to
cameras in the courtroom and other technological advances in public
communications does not stem from ignorance of technology. By and
large, the Court's opinions actually indicate a remarkable understanding
of technology. Instead, these opinions reveal that the Court is often
cautious in the face of technological developments not because the
Justices do not understand those developments but rather because they
are not confident that they can predict the future of technology and the
development of social norms that will surround its use. Furthermore, the
Court is generally hesitant to revisit its prior decisions and pre-existing
doctrinal framework and often chooses to issue more narrow decisions to
avoid the difficult jurisprudential questions new technology can present.
The third and final section of this Article concludes that the Court's
reluctance to embrace modem communications technology has less to do
with its lack of understanding of that technology and more to do with its
concerns about the modem media culture. While the Court's resistance to
cameras in the courtroom may diminish with time, it does not appear that
we will see cameras at the Court anytime soon. In the meantime, rather
than focusing solely on convincing the Court to permit cameras to record
its proceedings, advocates for increased public access to the Court's
work should devote at least part of their energy to thinking beyond
cameras to other ways in which the Court could evolve to accommodate
the expectations of the public in a changing media environment.
II. TECHNOLOGY AT THE COURT

In order to understand the Court's reluctance to use modem
communications technology, it is helpful to take a look at the history of
its public communications as well as the Justices' personal use and
understanding of communications technology. This Part demonstrates
that throughout its history, the Court has been slow to embrace new

13. I will focus on cases involving communications technology. Depending on how one
defines technology, it would be possible to examine the effects of technolq,oy in virtually every
doctrinal area on the Court's docket. For example, for a discussion of the Court's treatment of
technological developments at issue in its Commerce Clause cases, see Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory (!/the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011 ).
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technology. The Justices' personal use and understanding of technology
differs from Justice to Justice, but generally speaking it is consistent with
the use of technology by others in their peer group.
A. Communications with the Press and the Public
The last several years have seen an explosive use of communications
technology in America's courtrooms. 14 Many state courts around the
country, including state supreme courts, permit cameras in their
courtrooms. 15 Indeed, in the state courts the issue is no longer whether
cameras should be permitted, but what other things should be done to
adapt to modern-day journalist and technological realities. For example,
a pilot project in a state court in Quincy, Massachusetts, has installed
live-streaming cameras in the courtrooms and provided free WiFi access
to anyone who comes to the courthouse to make it easier for citizen
journalists to cover a case. 16 Several state courts around the country have
created official Twitter pages to alert the interested public when new
opinions or other material is posted. 17 Other progressive courts have
changed their rules to expand the definition of news media to include
anyone who regularly disseminates information of public interest and
permits them to make use of "pool cameras" and to transmit from the
courtroom using cellphones, laptops, and other electronic devices. 18

14. Foreign courts have also been less hesitant to embrace cameras. Liptak, supra note 2
(noting that the Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom allow
cameras).
15. Cameras in the Court: A State-by-State Guide, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS
Ass'N, (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://rtdna.org/article/cameras_in_the_court_a_state
_by_state_guide_updated.
16. Justin Ellis. Reality TV: OpenCourt Has Begun Its Livestream of the Judicial System,
NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (May 3, 20 II, I :00 PM), http://www.niemanlab.org/20 11/05/ reality-tvopencourt-has-begun-its-livestream-of-the-judicial-system.
17. See Florida Supreme Court Begins Using Twitter, FLA. BAR NEWS (May I, 2010),
http://bit.ly/fla-sup-ct-on-twitter; John P. Martin, Pa. Supreme Court to Go on Twitter, PHILLY.COM
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://bit.ly/pa-sup-ct-on-twitter.
18. Watch
Live
Video from
Quincy
District
Court,
PATRIOT
LEDGER,
http://www. patriotledger.com/homepage/breaking/x 11464 72520/Live-streaming-video-goes-liveMay-2-at-Quincy-District-Court (last updated Jan 8, 2013); see also Press Release, Supreme Judicial
Court Public Information Office, News Media Registration Under SJC Rule I: 19 Now Available
Online
(Aug.
13,
2012),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/docs/rule-119-press-release.pdf
(announcing new rules for Massachusetts state courts permitting anyone who regularly disseminates
matters of public interest to the public to register as a member of the news media and make use of
the pool camera or electronic devices in the courtroom with the permission of the presiding judge).
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom also recently began to allow tweeting from the
courtroom. See Tweeting Allowed in Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2011, 3:42 PM),
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Federal courts have been a bit slower to evolve their communications
practices, but the district and appellate courts have begun to make steady
progress. In 1972, the Judicial Conference amended the Code of Conduct
for federal judges to add a prohibition against "broadcasting, televising,
recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately
adjacent thereto." 19 In 1990, the Judicial Conference recommended and
ultimately implemented a three-year pilot program in two appellate and
six district courts to evaluate the use of cameras in civil proceedings. 20
This pilot program led the Judicial Conference to conclude that cameras
had intimidating effects on some jurors and witnesses and declined to
expand the use of cameras in civil proceedings. 21 Distinguishing
between appellate and trial proceedings, the Judicial Conference
permitted the appellate courts in 1996 to decide for themselves whether
to permit cameras but prohibited cameras at the district court level. 22
Justices Sonia Sotomayor, 23 Samuel Ali to, 24 and Stephen Breyer25 have
all supported cameras in the courts when they were judges on the circuit
level.
Currently, the Judicial Conference is reconsidering whether cameras
should be permitted at the district court level and has sponsored a new
pilot program to examine the use of cameras in fourteen federal district
courts. 26 Starting in July 2011, cameras have been permitted in civil
cases heard before the participating courts as long as the parties
consent. 27 These recordings are made publicly available on uscourts.gov
http://www.guardian.co. uk/law/20 11/feb/03/ tweeting-allowed-in-supreme-court.
19. History of Cameras in the Federal Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov
/Multimedia/Cameras/history.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
20. !d.
21. !d.
22. !d.
23. Tony Mauro, Cameras in Court May Get Boost, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (July 16,
2009), http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=21838 (noting that in her
confirmation hearings Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that she supported cameras in the
courtroom, and that her former court, the Second Circuit, had cameras in its courtroom).
24. Tony Mauro, A/ito Well-Versed in First Amendment, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan.
17, 2006), http://archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id= 16316 (quoting Justice Ali to's
statements in his confirmation hearings that he had voted in favor of allowing cameras in the
courtroom when he had served as a judge on the Third Circuit).
25. Matt Sundquist, Cameras and the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29, 2010, 8:17
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/cameras-and-the-supreme-court (noting how Justice
Breyer permitted cameras into the First Circuit when he served as a judge on that court).
26. !d.
27. Robert Ambrogi, Federal Court in Boston to Announce New Rules on Cameras and
Coverage Today, MEDIAL. (Oct. 6, 2011,8:16 AM), http://medialaw.legaline.com/2011110/federal-
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and other local participating websites to be determined in the court's
discretion. 28 In addition, the district court in Massachusetts has
established a "virtual press box" that gives holders of media
identification credentials increased access to the electronic filing
system. 29 This new program will also permit members of the media to
sign up for alerts on any new filings made in cases they choose to
follow. 30
The highest federal court in the land has been much more reluctant to
embrace modem information technology to communicate quickly and
easily with the press and public. Indeed, when Chief Justice Roberts was
asked recently about when the Court would permit cameras in the
courtroom, he reminded his audience that "one of the architectural motifs
on the base of our lamp posts throughout [the Supreme Court] is a turtle .
. . . And that's to indicate that we move slowly but surely and on a stable
basis." 31
At the outset, it is important to note that the current Justices
apparently do not share a single, unified view regarding the wisdom of
allowing cameras in the courtroom. Although retired Justice David
Souter famously told Congress that cameras in the Supreme Court would
roll "over my dead body," 32 some of the other Justices have publicly
stated that they would be in favor of permitting cameras. For example,
Justice Kagan has said, "I think it's a good idea ... If everybody could
see this it would make them feel so good about this branch of
government and how it operates." 33 That said, other Justices such as
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia have publicly
opposed cameras, and Justice Alito, who voted in favor of cameras while
serving as a judge on a lower federal court, is also reluctant to embrace
cameras at the Supreme Court. 34

court-in-boston-to-announce-new.html.
28. History of' Cameras in the Federal Courts, supra note 19.
29. Ambrogi, supra note 27.
30. !d.
31. De Vogue, supra note I.
32. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says 'Over Mv Dead Body,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1996, at A24, availahle at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-courtsouter-says-over-my-dead-body.html.
33. Robin Hagan, Justice Kagan Talk\· Cameras in the Supreme Court, Collegiality,
FIND LAW (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2011 /08/ justice-kagantalks-cameras-in-the-supreme-court-collegiality.html.
34. Justice A/ito: Few Would Watch High Court Arguments on TV, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-alito-few-would-watch-high-
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1. Recordings and transcripts of oral argument and opinion
announcements; orders and opinions
It is common knowledge that the Court has never permitted still or

video cameras in the courtroom, either for oral argument or opinion
announcements, regardless of the public interest in the legal issues at
stake. 35 Although for decades there has been a push for cameras in the
courtroom, the Court has repeatedly rejected these attempts. 36 The only
step it has made in the direction of permitting cameras is a baby step at
best; the Court permits a closed-circuit transmission of the proceedings
to an overflow room in the courthouse. 37 Justice Breyer has indicated
that overflow transmission to other courthouses might also be a
possibility, but that idea has not become a reality yet. 38
The Court has traditionally been slow to update its communications
with the public to take advantage of advances in technology. For
example, the Court took a long time after the technology was available to
release transcripts and audio recordings of its proceedings; indeed, even
today the Court does not make transcripts and audio recordings
accessible as quickly as it could. The Court first made audio recordings
of oral arguments available for archival purposes only in 1955, decades
after the technology was available. 39 Even then the Court, which
deposited the tapes with the National Archives, did not make recordings
available until after the Term concluded. 40 After CBS broadcasted a
portion of the oral argument in the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, the

court-arguments-on-tv; Debra Cassens Weiss, A/ito Warns of 'Observer Effect' if Courtroom
Cameras Are Allowed, ABA J. (Oct. I, 2010, 7:51 AM), http://www.abajoumal.
com/news/article/alito_wams_of_observer_effect_if_courtroom_cameras_are_allowed.
35. In 1988, the Court pennitted advocates for cameras in the courtroom to stage a
demonstration of how cameras would work in the Supreme Court chamber. This experiment
received little publicity; more importantly, it seemed to have little effect on the Court. Mauro, supra
note 4, at 264--65.
36. Justice Souter famously said to Congress in 1996 that "the day you see a camera come
into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead body." On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter
Says, 'Over My Dead Bodv,' supra note 32. Justice Souter's comments echoed those of Chief Justice
Burger a decade earlier. Howard Rosenberg, Burger's Day in Moyers' Court, L.A. TIMES, July 9,
1986, at J9 (quoting Justice Burger making an over-my-dead-body comment in an earlier CBS
interview).
37. See Liptak, supra note 2.
38. !d.
39. Roy M. Mersky & Kumar Percy, The Supreme Court Enters the Internet Age, 63 TEX.
B.J. 569, 569 (2000), available at http://www.llrx.com/features/supremect.htm.
40. !d.

1907

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

Court stopped sending tapes to the National Archives for fifteen years. 41
When the Court began releasing recordings again in 1986, it required
those who wanted to listen to them to receive permission from the Court,
which would be granted only if the applicant promised to use them solely
for educational and noncommercial purposes. 42 Only after Peter Irons
and Stephanie Guitton violated this agreement by publishing a selection
of edited oral argument audiotapes and transcripts in May It Please the
Court did the Court permit the National Archives to sell the recordings. 43
The Court waited until 2000, when it heard Bush v. Gore, 44 to
release these audio recordings to the press and the public on the same
day they were made. 45 The release of audio recordings initially rested in
the Court's sole discretion, which it exercised sparingly. 46 During the
2009-2010 term, the Court denied all seven media requests for same-day
release. 47 In 2010, the Court revised its policy to permit the release of the
audio recordings for all oral arguments, but it does not release the audio
recordings on the same day. 48 Instead, it releases a week's worth of
arguments every Friday. 49 Given that the Court never hears oral
argument on Fridays, this new policy means that the Court does not
routinely release audio recordings on the same day they were made. 50 In
March 2012, the Court agreed to release the audio of the oral arguments
in the Affordable Health Care Act case on the same day, 51 but the
general Friday release policy remains in effect.
Making use of the audio recordings can be challenging, especially
for those not as familiar with the Court's docket or with the Justices. It
can be difficult for interested members of the public to find the audio
they are looking for because the recordings are listed by case name only,

41. !d.
42. !d.
43. !d. at 569-70.
44. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
45. Bruce G. Peabody, "Supreme Court TV": Televising the Least Accountable Branch?, 33
J. LEGIS. 144, 148~9 (2007).
46. Mauro, supra note 4, at 266.
47. /d.at267.
48. !d.
49. !d.
50. !d.
51. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court to Expedite Release of Audio for Health Care Arguments,
BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 16,2012,4:30 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ blt/2012/03/supremecourt-turns-down-video-for -health-care-arguments. html.
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without annotation. 52 Furthermore, listening to the audio can be difficult
for someone not familiar with the voices of the individual Justices unless
one follows along with a copy of the transcript to determine who is
speaking. 53
The Court has also been slow to release oral argument transcripts,
and until recently they were difficult to use. In 1996, Linda Greenhouse
complained that it took two weeks for the Court to release the transcripts,
even though the technology existed for the Court to release them on the
same day. 54 It was also not until 2004 that the transcripts indicated which
Justice asked which question; instead, the transcript simply read,
"QUESTION." 55 The Court did not begin releasing same-day transcripts
of oral arguments until 2006. 56
The Court was slow to make its opinions electronically accessible to
the public. Opinions and other court orders were first made electronically
accessible in I 992 through the subscription-only HERMES Bulletin
Board System. 57 Three years later, the Court established its own bulletin
board system to make available to the general public slip opinions and
other items. 58 In 2000, the Court established its own website. 59 This
website gives the public and press alike access to the Court's opinions,
argument schedule, briefs, oral argument recordings, and transcripts. The
Court posts opinions and orders in PDF form on the website until they
come out in the print volume of U.S. Reports. In 2010, the Court updated
its website to provide "enhanced search capabilities." 60 The PDFs use
optical character recognition that permits the text of the opinions to be
easily searched, copied, and pasted. Critics have noted that one way the
Court could improve its website is by converting the opinions and orders
into HTML when available, with page numbers. 61 In addition, the

52. Lisa T. McElroy, Cameras at the Supreme Court: A Rhetorical Analysis, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 1837.
53. /d.
54. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme
Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1559 (1996).
55. Mauro, supra note 4, at 267.
56. !d.
57. Mersky & Percy, supra note 39.
58. /d.
59. /d.
60. Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.supremecourt
.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName=pr_03-18-l O.html.
6 I. Bradley J. Hillis, The U.S. Supreme Court Web Site: A Judicial Review, JURIST LEGAL
INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 29, 2000), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/courttech5.htm.
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Court's website does not make available audio recordings of the opinion
announcements. Instead, such recordings are available at www.oyez.org.
When the healthcare decision was announced in June, the millions of
people trying to get access to the Court's opinion on the official website
overwhelmed the server's capacity. As a result of this crushing demand,
the Court was effectively unable to publish its decision on its website for
about half an hour after the decision was announced in open court. 62 This
meant that everyone not in the courtroom was waiting for reports from
the press to find out what had happened, and the inaccurate reporting
from some media outlets confused a lot of people, including President
Obama. 63
Although the Court's website is an encouraging step in the right
direction, the Court has not embraced the full range of communications
technology that it could to communicate with the public. For example,
the Court does not use Twitter, Facebook, or any other social media
platform that would permit interested followers to receive notification
when new material is posted. The Justices have largely deflected calls for
the Court to embrace social media, but it appears that their opposition is
to individual Justices using social media to communicate with the public,
rather than the Court as an institution making use of social media to
improve its communications. For example, Justice Sotomayor has said
that people would find it "very unsatisfying" to interact with judges on
social media because they cannot debate with the public in the same way
that politicians engage with their constituents. 64 Justice Breyer has
likewise stated that he believes it would be inappropriate for the Justices
to have followers on Twitter or friends on Face book. 65
While it would indeed be inappropriate for the Justices to provide
tutorials on legal issues or discuss their votes in unreleased decisions, it
still would be possible for the Court as an institution to use social media
to communicate with the public about what is happening at the Court.

62. Tom Goldstein, We're Getting Wildly Differing Assessments, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 7,
2012, I 0:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 12/07/were-getting-wildly-differing-assessments.
63. !d. ("At the White House, there is more to the story than the spin that the President
believed the Administration had lost the case only for a very short period of time. In fact, for at least
a few minutes he thought the opposite and for more than five minutes, he had substantially worse
information than many Americans.").
64. Kathy Matheson, Sotomayor Visits Penn ji1r Law School Dedication, PHJLLY.COM (Apr.
6, 2012, 6:13 AM), http://bit.ly/sotomayor-visits-penn-for-law-school-dedication.
65. Stephanie Francis Ward, .Justice Breyer's on Twitter and Facehook, hut Don't Count on
Him Friending You, ABA J. (Apr. 14, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com
/news/articleibreyer_on_facebook_but_dont_count_on_him_friending_you.
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Indeed, the Justices are aware that their work is increasingly dissected on
websites, blogs, and social media platforms. Nonofficial sources, like
SCOTUSblog, 66 have proven to be indispensable guides to the Court's
work. SCOTUSblog provides real-time summaries of oral arguments and
opinion announcements as well as a host of additional information about
pending cases and petitions for certiorari. The Justices appear to
welcome the attention their work has received. Justice Kennedy testified
to Congress that it is good for social media to cover the Court's work. 67
Although for most of the twentieth century the Justices avoided
appearing in the broadcast media, 68 in the last few decades the Justices
have increasingly been willing to sit down for televised interviews and to
permit audio and visual recording when they are giving speeches or
lectures, particularly when they have a book to promote or a particular
message they want to get out. 69 In addition, in 2009 retired Associate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor launched the website "iCivics" to educate
young people about their government. 70 The website offers a broad range
of educational video games and activities for middle- and high-school
students. 71 The Justices' increasing use of modern media to get out their
own messages indicates that they are very much aware of the important
role the media plays in our society.

66. SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Jan 26, 2013). The importance
of SCOTUSBlog cannot be overstated. Website publisher Tom Goldstein has reported that usage
data indicates that staff members of the Court access the website and that the site received 5.3
million page views the day the Court released its Affordable Health Care Act decision. Mallary Jean
Tenore, Why It's So Hardfor SCOTUSB/og to Get Supreme Court Press Credentials, POYNTER.ORG
(Jul. II, 2012, I: I 0 PM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/top-stories/180581/why-its-so-hardfor-scotusblog-to-get-credentialed.
67. Ward, supra note 65.
68. In 1958, Justice Douglas became the first Justice to sit for a televised interview. RICHARD
DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA 150 (2011 ). Justice
Scalia has had the most dramatic change of heart regarding cameras. For many years, he was known
for his vehement opposition to audio or visual recording of his public appearances-even going as
far as confiscating reporters' tape recorders. /d. at 172.
69. /d. at xiv-xv, 151 ("The justices appear to have shed their camera shyness."). While a full
account and summary of the Justices' televised appearances and general relationship with the press
is beyond the scope of this Article, interested readers should consult Davis's book for details. In
addition, in this symposium issue, RonNell Anderson Jones provides additional details about the
reluctance of some Justices to engage with the media. See Ron Nell Anderson Jones, U.S. Supreme
Court Justices and Press Access, BYU Law Review Symposium: The Press, the Public, and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
70. What Is iCivics?, !CiVICS, http://www.icivics.org/About (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
71. We've Got Games', !CIVICS, http://www.icivics.org/games (last visited Jan. 26, 20 13).
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2. Press access

The Supreme Court has not made it easy for the press to cover the
Court. Its policies regarding the release of opinions, the use of
technology in the courtroom, and press credentialing all have room for
improvement.
The Court releases opinions when they are completed with little
attention to the difficulties that a crush of high-profile opinions will
cause for the press. Until 1965, the Court released opinions only on
Mondays. 72 This practice inevitably meant that at the end of each Term
there would be a crush of decisions coming down at once, and reporters
and editors dealing with limited time and space had to make difficult
decisions about which ones to cover. 73 Justice Frankfurter repeatedly
urged his colleagues to abandon the Monday-only rule in order to help
the press coverage of the Court and prevent "public indigestion, with
consequent misinformation and mischievous reaction to decisions." 74
Although this change was helpful, reporters still had to deal with the
crush of opinions that would come out at the end of each term. In 1996,
Linda Greenhouse wrote about her frustration with the Court's practice
of releasing its opinions in clusters, especially in June, rather than
spreading them out over two or three days. 75 When she offered this
suggestion to then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, he unhelpfully suggested that
she spread out her reporting over two or three days. 76 In Greenhouse's
opinion, the Court did not intentionally make itself "mysterious and
remote" but rather the Court was "quite blithely oblivious to the needs of
those who convey its work to the outside world.'m
In recent years, the Clerk of the Court, William Suter, has tried to
avoid the release of particularly newsworthy decisions on the same day
as oral argument so that reporters will not face the impossible choice of
reading and reporting the newsworthy case or listening to oral
argument. 78 Despite these efforts, reporters still continue to face this

72. DAVIS, supra note 68, at 143.
73. !d.
74. !d.
75. Greenhouse, supra note 54, at 1558.
76. !d. at 1558-59.
77. !d. at 1559.
78. Brigham Young University Law Review Symposium, The Press, the Public, and the U.S.
Panel
(Jan.
26,
2012),
www.law2.byu.edu/
Supreme
Court,
Journalist
of Lyle
videos_index/LawReviewSymposium%20-%20Joumalist%20Panel.wmv
(statement
Denniston).
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Hobbesian choice any day when opinions are announced on the day of
oral argument. 79 Although even reporters recognize it is not realistic to
expect the Court to space out its opinions to make things "easier" for the
press corps, some have suggested that the Court could make coverage
easier by giving the press some advance notice when opinions are
coming so that they can review the briefs and brush up on the issues
involved, or give reporters in "lock up" access to copies of the Court's
opinions at 9:30 (half an hour before they are announced in open court)
so that they have a little extra time to read and digest the opinions before
reporting on them. 80
Reporters at the Supreme Court are not allowed to use cell phones or
any other electronic devices from the courtroom where decisions are
announced. This ban means that reporters must take notes on the
proceedings by long-hand, and they are unable to transmit information
from the courtroom to their editors-or the public-without leaving the
courtroom. In order to facilitate the rapid transmission of the Court's
decisions to the public, some reporters choose to listen to the opinion
announcements in the Court's Public Information Office, where live
audio from the Court can be heard. 81 Linda Greenhouse has described
the press room as "about the size of a subway car," and when reporters
are awaiting the release of an opinion in a high-profile case-as they
were for Bush v. Gore in 2000-that room can become "like the most
crowded rush hour subway car ever." 82 In high-profile cases, additional
reporters are often stationed on the courthouse steps waiting to do a
stand-up interview once they hear word of the decision from their
colleagues inside the Court or obtain a copy of the opinion from a
runner. 83 The moment the decision is announced in the courtroom, the
staff in the Public Information Office opens a huge white box and hands

79. !d.
80. !d. At the symposium, Lyle Denniston and Dahlia Lithwick appeared to endorse a lockup idea; Dahlia Lithwick also suggested an advance-notice policy; and Tony Mauro expressed
concern that advance notice might disrupt the markets.
81. How
the
Court
Works:
News
Media,
SUP.
CT.
HIST.
Soc'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/how-the-court-work/news-media
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2013 ).
82. Linda Greenhouse, Thinking about the Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, 35 IND. L.
REv. 435, 435 (2002). Greenhouse also complained that the Court personnel refused to provide
reporters with any indication about when the opinion might be released, leading them all to remain
captive in the press room for hours while they fielded anxious calls from their editors and fought off
starvation until a few reporters took up a collection for pizza. !d.
83. Goldstein, supra note 62.
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out copies of the slip opinions. The reporters then scramble to get to their
computers to read and report the decisions via telephone or over the
Internet to their editors, or they rush to the Court plaza to do a "stand up"
report. 84 After the Court began posting its opinions on its website, it
stopped e-mailing copies of the opinions to reporters because it assumed
that reporters could get copies of the opinions online. 85 As noted above,
however, the release of the healthcare decision demonstrated that the
website is not infallible.
Another stumbling block in the Court's public communications is its
outdated press credentialing system. The Court adheres to a rather
antiquated method of press credentialing prevalent in the nation's
Capital. The Court credentialing process is derivative; it requires
applicants to already possess active congressional press credentials (or
White House credentials, which are also derivative of congressional
credentials). Only twenty-six journalists have permanent Court
credentials, and the rest must use temporary day passes. 86
Obtaining congressional press credentials can be difficult-if not
impossible-for many publications. There are two different procedures
to obtain press accreditation in Congress, and the one required depends
on the type of publication. For daily publications, the Senate Rules
Committee works with the Senate Press Gallery staff to oversee the
credentialing process for the Standing Committee of Correspondents,
which issues the three types of congressional press passes for daily
publications: a one-day pass, a temporary pass, and a permanent pass. 87
An applicant must be a "full-time, paid correspondent" employed by a
news organization "whose principal business is the daily dissemination
of original news and opinion of interest to a broad segment of the public,
and which has published continuously for 18 months." 88 For magazines,
84. !d.; How the Court Works, supra note 81; Nick Judd, The Fast-Paced Frenzy of' a LowTech Supreme Court, ABC NEWS (June 28, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ OTUS/fastpaced-frenzy-low-tech-supreme-court/story?id= 16664707; Sarah Kliff, How Will You Know ll
Obamacare Still Stands Tomorrow? Probably from Lvle, WONKBLOG (June 27, 2012, II: 14 AM),
http://bit.ly/how-you-will-know-if-obamacarc-still-stands.
85. Goldstein, supra note 62.
86. Tenore, supra note 66.
87. Rules Governing the Press Ga//ety, U.S. SENATE DAILY PRESS GALLERY,
http://www.senate.gov/galleries/daily/ rules2.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013 ).
88. !d. The rules also deem eligible full-time, paid employees of news organizations with
"General Publications periodicals mailing privileges under U.S. postal service rules." !d. Periodical
publications can receive mailing privileges if they intend to distribute indefinitely and on a regular
basis information of a general or specific nature. See U.S. POSTAL SERV., HANDBOOK DM-204
(2002), http://about.usps.com/handbooks/dm204.pdf.
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newsletters, nondaily newspapers, and online publications, accreditation
is handled through the Periodical Press Gallery, which is currently
controlled by the House (it rotates between each body periodically). New
applicants can be deterred due to the lengthy application process, which
can take up to a year. 89 The Press Gallery undergoes a screening that
adheres to five rules and six regulations, which mandate that applicants
be employed by a periodical that is published for profit and is supported
chiefly by advertising or by subscription. 90 Nonprofit organizations are
permitted to apply for credentials provided that they "operate
independently of any government, industry, or institution" and do not
engage "directly or indirectly" in any lobbying. 91 Some blogs and
Internet-only news outlets like Talking Points Memo, the Huffington
Post, and the Daily Caller have been able to satisfy these standards and
have received credentials. 92 Other online-only publications may rely less
on subscriptions or broad-based advertising for their revenue and can
have trouble receiving credentials from Congress. 93
With a changing multimedia environment, as well as changing
funding models for print and online resources, Congress has come under
fire for what seems to be a byzantine and arcane accreditation process.
Senator Kerry held a hearing on this issue in 2009, but reform efforts
have stalled. At this hearing, Senator Kerry noted that the Standing
Committee of Correspondent's role in credentialing dates back to 1877
and warned that Congress should "be careful about how we change" the
system of accreditation to treat online reporters fairly. 94
The current credentialing system also does not account for the
changing structure of news outlets. The best example of the current
problems with the credentialing system is the inability of SCOTUSblog
to obtain press credentials. For ten years, this website-begun by Tom
Goldstein and Amy Howe as an effort to drive business to their law
firm-has served as the go-to source for information about the Court. 95

89. New Applicant Instructions, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERIODICAL PRESS
GALLERY, http://periodical.house.gov/app-new.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
90. Rules and Regulations, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES PERIODICAL PRESS GALLERY,
http://pcriodical.house.gov/rules.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 20 13).

91. !d.
92. Tenore, supra note 66.
93. !d.
94. Josh Steams, The Debate Over Press Credentials, STORIFY, http://storify.com/
jcsteams/thc-dcbatc-over-prcss-credentials (last visited Jan. 26, 20 13).
95. Staci D. Kramer, SCOTUSblog: After a Decade, an Overnight Sensation, PAIDCONTENT
(Jun. 29, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/06/29/scotusblog-after-a-decadc-an-ovemight-

1915

2012

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Last spring, on the day CNN and FOX famously bungled the reporting of
the Court's anxiously awaited health care decision, 96 over a million
readers benefited from SCOTUSblog's careful and reliable reporting and
legal analysis. 97 The website, now sponsored by Bloomberg Law, has
four full-time staffers, ten additional active contributors, and over I 00
experts who contribute at least one piece during the Court's Term. 98
Ironically, despite the crucial role SCOTUSblog plays in informing
the public, it cannot obtain a press pass for its reporters to enter the
courtroom to hear oral argument and the announcement of decisions.
Although its reporter Lyle Dennison has a press pass, this is only because
he also works for WBUR in Boston and is able to obtain a press pass as a
result of that affiliation. 99 Senate Press Gallery Director Joe Keenan has
said that the problem for SCOTUSblog is the requirement that the
applicant not be involved in any lobbying or paid advocacy or promotion
work before Congress or any federal government department. 10 Keenan
reported that in June 20 I 0 his office concluded that the website was not
completely separate from the law firm where Goldstein and a number of
other authors for the website practiced. 101 Goldstein contests this
explanation, however. He recently stated that he was told the website
should not bother applying for press credentials because it was not
supported by advertising or subscriptions. 102
Although it seems clear that SCOTUSblog should receive permanent
press credentials, it will not necessarily be easy for Congress to
determine, in our rapidly changing media environment, who or what
constitutes "the press." 103 It is enough for purposes of this Article to

°

sensation.
96. Paul Farhi, Early Reports on Health-Care Decision from CNN, Fox Overturned One
Mandate: Accuracy, WASH. PosT (June 28, 2012), http://wapo.st/WaUOaO.
97. See Rebecca Rosen, Internet Gone Wild! SCOTUSblog Explodes with Health-Care
Enthusiasm, ATLANTIC (Jun. 28, 2012, II :34 AM), http://bit.ly/intemet-gone-wild-SCOTUSblog.
98. Dan Diamond, Regardless of ObamaCare Decision, SCOTUSblog Has Already Won,
FORBES (Jun. 24, 2012, 2:43PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2012/06/ 24/regardlessof-obamacare-decision-scotusblog-has-already-won.
99. Tenore, supra note 66.
100. !d.
101. !d.
102. !d.
103. For a more extensive discussion of the difficulties of defining what constitutes "the
press," see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REv. 515, 564-84 (2007) (discussing the various approaches that statutes, courts, and commentators
have taken in defining who can invoke the reporter's privilege); see also David A. Anderson,
Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 436-46 (2002) (discussing the various approaches taken
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note, however, that something is clearly wrong with a credentialing
system that excludes one of the best sources of information about the
Supreme Court.
B. Justices' Personal Use of New Technology

The Justices are not as technologically ignorant as many have
depicted. Although their formal communications with each other remain
quaintly old-fashioned, increasingly the Justices are using modern
technology in both their professional and personal lives. None of the
Justices appears to be a technophile, but they do seem to be just about as
familiar with technology as anyone their ages might be.
At the Court, the Justices still retain traditional methods of
communicating with each other. The Justices do not use e-mail to
circulate draft opinions or to indicate their "joins," suggestions for
revision, or plans to write separately; instead, they rely on their chamber
aides to carry hard copies of whatever the Justices wish to communicate
with other chambers. 104 This respect for tradition and ritual permeates
much of what occurs at the Court. 105
The Court was rather slow in getting Internet access and remains
very concerned about cybersecurity. When the Court decided to provide
access to the Internet in 2002, it went so far as to install an additional
computer at each desk for this purpose. 106 To this day the Court
maintains two terminals at each desk with a switch that allows users to
alternate between the systems. 107 The Court also maintains two separate
e-mail systems; one operates only internally within the Court, and the
other that operates externally. 108 This cumbersome approach effectively

to defining "the press").
104. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Justices Don't Communicate by Email, Kagan Says, ABA J.
(Oct.
17,
20 II),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/justices_dont_communicate_by_
email_kagan_says (reporting Justice Kagan's remarks that while the Supreme Court clerks use email to talk to each other, the Justices "ignore 25 years of technology" and "prefer to communicate
via hand-delivered memos"); see a/so WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 231 (2001)
(mentioning the use of aides to carry communications to other chambers).
105. See McElroy, supra note 52, at 1856-1860 (describing in detail the various traditions and
rituals at the Court).
106. E-mail from Linda Stout, Secretary of Justice Souter, to Mary-Rose Papandrea, Assoc.
Professor, Bos. Coli. Law Sch. (Nov. 12, 2012) (on file with author). From my own experience as a
law clerk in 1997, I remember the internal-only e-mail system.
107. /d.
I 08. E-mail from Linda Stout, Secretary of Justice Souter, to Mary-Rose Papandrea, Assoc.
Professor, Bos. Coil. Law Sch. (Nov. 21, 20 12) (on file with author).
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walls off the Court's internal e-mail system from the outside world and
protects the Court's documents from hackers.
Although the Justices hew strongly to traditions and rituals of the
Court, the way they do their work has been evolving with the times. To
be sure, some Justices are slower to evolve than others. Justice Souter,
who retired in 2009, famously refused to use a computer, much less the
Internet or social media. Although he has said that he now owns a Kindle
and has used an iPad, he does not appear very comfortable with the
devices. Indeed, at a recent Harvard reunion, he entertained his former
classmates with a story about how he tried to use an iPad. 109 He said it
was "terrific," "until he found he couldn't tum it off, and had to place it
in a bathroom with the door closed." 11 Chief Justice Roberts, who at
fifty-eight years old is over two decades younger than Justice Souter,
says he knows how to use a computer but prefers to write his opinions
out by long hand. He explains that he was 'just a couple years too late"
to learn how to use a computer to write because the "technological
revolution was slightly behind [him]" when he was in college and law
school. 111 But age does not always determine technological proficiency.
Justice Stevens, who retired from the Court in 2007 at the age of ninety,
was reportedly at least as computer-savvy as his clerks and was using a
computer as far back as the early 1990s. 112
When it comes to reading briefs, conducting legal research, and
writing opinions, many of the Justices are increasingly embracing new
technology. Justice Scalia said he uses his computer so much that he can

°

109. Elaine McArdle, Justices Breyer and Souter Reminisce on Law School and High Court
Experience, HARV. L. SCH. (Nov. 4, 20 II), http://law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/alumnipursuits/breyer-and -souter-rem in i sce.html.
110. !d.
Ill. Supreme Court Project: Interview by Susan Swain with John Roberts, Chief Justice. U.S.
Supreme Court, in Wash., D.C. (C-SPAN television broadcast Oct. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/clip/678298 (a transcript of this interview may be found at
http://supremecourt.c-span.org/assets/pdf/JRoberts.pdf); Contra Supreme Court Project.· Interview
by Susan Swain with Sonia Sotomayor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in Wash .• D.C. (CSPAN
television
broadcast
Oct.
9,
2009),
available
at
http://www.c-spanarch
ives.org/program/BreyerT (Justice Sotomayor saying that she uses a computer to draft her opinions)
(a transcript of this interview may be found at http://supremecourt.c-span.org/
assets/pdti'SSotomayor.pdf).
112. Timothy B. Lee, Farewell, Stevens: The Supreme Court Loses Its Cryptographer, ARS
TECHNICA (June 28, 20 I 0, I :45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20 I 0/06/the-supreme-courtloses-its-cryptographer/2; Tony Mauro, You Can Thank (or Curse) Stevens .filr Internet Freedom.
USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2010, 4:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ news/opinion/forum/20 I 0-04-21column2l_STI_N.htm.
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"hardly write in longhand anymore." 113 Justices Scalia and Kagan
confessed to using an iPad and Kindle, respectively, to read legal
briefs. 114 As Justice Kagan has explained, there can be upwards of fifty
briefs for a single case. "So there is a lot of reading," she said. "And you
know that's a big part of the job and if a Kindle or an iPad can make it
easier, that's terrific." 115 Scalia has also indicated that "[w]hen he has to
take materials home for work, he uses a thumb drive, or accesses the
Court computer system remotely." 116 Scalia has said, "I don't have to
schlep the briefs around. Oh, it's a brave new world." 117
Scholarly attention is recently focusing on the Court's use of the
Internet to conduct legal research, 118 although it is often unclear whether
it is the Justices themselves doing this research or whether it is the law
clerks or other court personnel. Over a decade ago, Fred Schauer and
Virginia Wise's research revealed that the Court's access to Lexis and
Westlaw correlated with the Court's increased citation to "nonlegal"
authorities, like magazines and newspapers. 119 Now that online research
extends far beyond legal databases, Justices are frequently finding-and
citing-a broad range of authorities on the web, from highly prestigious
and reputable journals and newspapers, "to blog posts, sporting
magazines, interest group websites, and (in lower courts) even to
Wikipedia." 120 Scholars have noted that the Court's reliance on
"Google" searches is potentially disconcerting because it may amount to
fact-finding outside of the official record of a case, without input from
the parties or challenge from expert opinion. 121
Although it appears that most of the Justices now regularly use a
computer to do their work and conduct research online-and some

113. David Lat, Justice Scalia at the Federalist Society Fete, ABOVETHELAW.COM (Nov. 20,
20 I0 ), http://abovethelaw.com/20 I 0/11 /justice-scalia-at-the-federalist-society-fete.
114. Jan Crawford, Kagan's Kindle v. Scalia's iPad, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:28 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/830 l-504564_162-20025455-504564.html.
115. !d.
116. Lat, supra note 113.
117. Robert Barnes, Scalia on Cameras, Retirement and the 'Brave New World,' WASH. POST
(Nov.
19,
20 I 0,
II :49
AM).
http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/II/19/AR2010111903067.html.
118. See Allison Orr Larsen, Conjronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255
(2012).
119. Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of
Law, 29 J. LEGALS IULJ. 495,497 (2000).
120. Larsen, supra note 118, at 1300.
121. !d. at 1301-05.
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Justices even use modem devices like iPads, iPods, and smart
phones 122-the Justices' personal use and understanding of modem
communications technology is hardly cutting edge. For example, Justice
Scalia-who appears to be one of the more technologically savvy of the
bunch 123-does not appear to be familiar with Twitter. When asked at a
Senate Judiciary Committee meeting about whether he has ever
considering tweeting, Scalia responded, "I don't even know what it is.
I've heard it talked about." 124 He added that his wife's pet name for him
is "Mr. Clueless." 125 Justice Breyer's public statements indicate that he
is more familiar with Twitter, revealing that he learned about the role of
Twitter in the Iranian uprisings from his son--on the other hand, he has
referred to tweets as "twitters." 126 Chief Justice Roberts has stated that
he is not entirely sure what Twitter is. 127
The Justices' apparently unfamiliarity with Twitter seems to reflect
their lack of experience with social networking more generally. In June
20 II, Chief Justice Roberts said that he does not believe any members of
the Court have a Facebook page, 128 but Justice Breyer told a
congressional committee just two months earlier that he uses Facebook
to communicate with his family. 129 Although Chief Justice Roberts does
not use Facebook himself, he appears to be very aware of its potential
dangers: he instructs incoming clerks to refrain from posting updates
about work on their social media accounts lest they inadvertently reveal
confidential information about the Court. 130 Justice Breyer has revealed
that he watched the movie The Social Network and "couldn't even

122. In 2007, Justice Thomas indicated that a number of the Justices used Blackberries. Fin.
Servs. & Gen. Gov 't Appropriations for 2008: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen.
Gov 't Appropriations: of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, II Oth Con g. 19 (2007) (statement of
Clarence Thomas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court).
123. Crawford, supra note 114 (reporting Justice Scalia's comments that he uses an iPad to
read legal briefs and loads classical music onto his iPod).
124. Dann, supra note 9.
125. !d.
126. !d. (quoting Justice Breyer as saying that his son introduced him to Twitter during the
Iranian election protests, and he read "Twitters" from Iranians for two hours).
127. Emil Protalinski, US Supreme Court: We're Not on Facehook, What's Twitter?, ZDNET
(June 28, 2011, 6:06 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/us-supreme-court-were-not-onfacebook-whats-twitter/1756 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as saying he does not believe anyone at
the Court tweets, "whatever that is").
128. !d.
129. Ward, supra note 65. During his congressional appearance, Justice Breyer referred to the
world's most popular social networking site as "the Facebook." !d.
130. Protalinski, supra note 127.
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understand [it]," 131 although it is not clear what exactly he could not
understand.
What we can glean about the Justices' use of technology indicates
that it is consistent with what we might expect from people their age. The
current active Justices' ages range from fifty-two (Justice Kagan) to
seventy-nine (Justice Ginsburg). Justices Sotomayor (fifty-eight), Alito
(sixty-two), and Thomas (sixty-four), as well as Chief Justice Roberts
(fifty-seven), are on the younger end of the spectrum; Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Breyer are in their mid-70s. 132 The Pew Research Center
reports that as of April2012, 53% of American adults ages sixty-five and
older use the Internet or e-mail. Among adults ages fifty to sixty-four,
77% use the Internet. "As of February 2012, one-third (34%) of internet
users ages 65 and older use social networking sites such as Facebook,
and 18% do so on a typical day." 133 Only 14% of adults ages fifty to
sixty-four own a tablet computer and only 16% own an e-reader. 134 A
significant number of older adults use Facebook, MySpace, or
Linkedln-51% of adults between the ages of fifty to sixty-four and 33%
of those over sixty-five years old 135-but much smaller percentages of
older adults use Twitter. A recent Pew survey reports that only 9% of
adults between the ages of fifty to sixty-four and 4% of adults over sixtyfive use Twitter. 136
Indeed, the Justices may be more familiar with technology than
many older adults because their law clerks help educate them. Justices
Thomas and Kennedy have publicly noted that the clerks bring their
technological knowledge to the Court and push for better technology
with which to do their jobs. 137 This is not encouraging, however, to those

131. Nitasha Tiku, Justice Breyer Confounded by Watching The Social Network, DAILY
INTELLIGENCER
(Nov.
17,
2010,
3:50
PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2010/ll/
justice_breyer_thoroughly_conf.html.
132. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUP. CT.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutlbiographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2013 ).
133. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, OLDER
ADULTS AND INTERNET USE, at 2 (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewintemet.org/-/
mediai/Fi les/Reports/20 12/PIP_ Older_adults_and_intemet_use.pdf.
134. !d. at 7.
135. KATHRYN ZICKUHR & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 65% OF
ONLINE ADULTS USE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES, at 4 (Aug. 26, 20Il), http://pewintemet
.org/-/mediai/Files/Reports/20 ll/PIP-SNS-Update-2011.pdf.
136. AARON SMITH & JOANNA BRENNER, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TWITTER USE
2012,
at
3
(May
31,
2012),
http://pewintemet.org/-/mediai/Files/Reports
120 12/PIP_ Twitter_Use_2012.pdf.
137. Mersky & Percy, supra note 39, at 569.
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commentators who have argued that members of the Supreme Court need
to be more than minimally familiar with the modem communications
technology that plays such an important role in our society. 138 In
addition, perhaps more important than a detailed understanding of the
relevant technology is an understanding of the social norms relating to
that technology. 139
III. THE COURT'S RECORD IN CASES INVOLVING COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY

One way of examining the Court's reluctance to embrace new
communications technology is by what the Court has said about
technology during oral arguments and in its decisions. If the Court does
not understand technology, or exhibits some sort of reluctance to engage
with technology, that might help us understand why as an institution it is
so reluctant to embrace technology to communicate with the public. My
cursory review of cases involving new technology-primarily First and
Fourth Amendment cases, as well as copyright cases-reveals that by the
time the Court issues an opinion, it demonstrates an admirable
understanding of the technology at issue. At the same time, in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court tends to be very cautious in cases
involving new technology and frequently issues narrow decisions. In
First Amendment cases, the Court as a whole has become increasingly
hostile to arguments in favor of new medium-specific First Amendment
standards and shows little deference to legislative findings in the face of
developing technologies. The Court's First Amendment decisions can

138. See Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties at the Court Causing a "Disregard ol
Duty"?, 3 J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3 (20 11) (arguing that it is "crucial for our most important
decision-makers, Supreme Court Justices, to have at least a rudimentary understanding of
technologies most Americans cannot imagine living without"); Arthur Bright, A Plea j(Jr a TechSavvy
Justice,
CITIZEN
MEDIA
L.
PROJECT
(Apr.
21,
2010).
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/20 10/plea-tech-savvy-justice; Brett Trout, The United States
Supreme Court v. Technology, BLAWGIT (Apr. 20, 20 I 0), http://blawgit.com/20 I 0/04 /20/theunited-states-suprcme-court-v-technology (arguing that it is "imperative that courts fully intom1
themselves" not only about the technologies at issue in the case but also about technology as a
whole). Richard Baum has suggested that term limits for Supreme Court Justices might help
alleviate this problem. Richard Baum, The Founding Fathers v. The Supreme Court, REUTERS (May
19, 20 I 0), http://hlogs.reutcrs.com/gregg-eastcrbrook/20 10/05119 /thc-founding-fathers-v-thesupreme-court ("Term limits further would prevent the Supreme Court from being a geriatric
institution whose members are out of touch with the country's culture and concerns.").
139. Grabowski, supra note 13R, at 10 (quoting Rebecca Tushnet as arguing that it is perhaps
even more important for the Court to understand "how different social groups experience the
world").
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also be characterized as cautious, however, in that they reflect a
reluctance to change and a steadfast commitment to protecting speech in
the face of uncertainty.
A. Cases the Court Doesn't Decide

Before considering how the Court treats technology in its decisions,
it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the cases involving new
technology that the Court does not decide. The Court often engages in
the "avoidance" method when it comes to new technology. Often when
the Court finally decides an issue involving new technology, it is only
after decades have passed. 14 For example, the Court waited almost six
decades after the invention of the telephone to address the Fourth
Amendment implications of wiretaps 141 -and ultimately ended up
reversing its decision almost forty years later. 142 Less dramatically, the
Court did not address the use of pen registers until 1979 even though
they had been in use since the 1960s. 143
Currently the Court has failed to provide guidance on a number of
importance legal issues involving new technology, despite disagreement
in the lower courts. Although we cannot know for certain why the Court
has decided to deny cert in a number of areas involving new technology,
it does appear that the Court prefers to wait to take on these issues until it
feels the lower courts have had ample opportunity to consider the cases
and the technology has evolved sufficiently. These delays can be
maddening as circuit splits develop, and the issues cry out for resolution.
For example, the Court has declined to address whether the First

°

140. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Mvths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 869 (2004) (pointing out that the Court did
not address the constitutionality of pen registers until 1979 even though they had been in widespread
use by the 1960s, and noting how long it took the Court to address wiretapping in the first place). To
be sure, there are instances when the Court did not hesitate to decide issues involving new
technology before the technology-and the social norms surrounding them-had fully developed.
The Court's decisions in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 ( 1984 ), and MetroGoldH:vn-Maver Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), are two examples. A
comprehensive review of the Court's certiorari decisions is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
might be that the Court feels more pressure to resolve cases involving new technology when lowercourt rulings threaten business interests and less pressure when cases involve individual rights. But
see Ronald Wright, The Abruptness of'Acton, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 401, 401~07 (2000) (noting that the
Court decided cases addressing the constitutionality of student drug testing before the practice was
widespread and before lower courts had much opportunity to address the issue).
141. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
143. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also Kerr, supra note 140.
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Amendment limits the ability of schools to punish students for their
online expression. 144 Although a circuit split has emerged on this issue,
the Court is no doubt concerned that it remains too soon to weigh in on
an issue where the technology is changing so rapidly. The Court has also
failed to take on any cases involving personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts 145-even though the issue has been brewing since the
mid-1990s.
Although I have not undertaken a systematic review of the Court's
cert denials to determine how many other times and in which contexts
the Court has declined the opportunity to review cases involving new
technology, it is plain from the few cases that the Court has resolved
involving technology and new media that the Court has not been
aggressive in this area. This uncertainty may be unsettling to litigants
(and anyone else who attempts to structure their conduct in light of the
relevant legal rules). In some cases, the Court's caution may be justified,
at least up to a point. For example, it may have been wise for the Court to
hold off on resolving a case involving personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts given how much the technology has changed in the
many years since the first courts decided Internet jurisdiction cases in the
mid-1990s. 146
Indeed, the Court may be reluctant to take on cases involving new
technology out of fear that any opinion it may issue will be outdated
within a few years. As Professor Stuart Benjamin has noted, "Rapidly
changing facts weaken the force of stare decisis by undermining the
stability of precedents. Appellate opinions are only as robust as the facts
on which they are based. When those facts evaporate, the opinion on
which they rest is weakened as we11." 14 7
Indeed, as Benjamin has demonstrated, the facts can change so
quickly that the record developed at the trial level is stale by the time the

144. Bill Mears, High Court Rejects Appeals on Public Prayers, Student Speech, CNN (Jan.
17, 20 12), http://articles.cnn.com/20 12-0 l-17/us/us_scotus-appeals_1_appeals-court-stud entspeech-high-court.
145. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011).
146. E.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.O. Pa. !997) (setting
forth a highly influential-but now outmoded-test for personal jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts).
147. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts
and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269,272 (1999).
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case reaches the Supreme Court. 148 For example, in Reno v. ACLU, 149
which struck down attempts to regulate indecency on the Internet, the
district court had made a factual finding that age verification was not
possible on the Internet, but by the time the case made its way to the
Court, such services had proliferated. 150 In addition, the government in
Reno attempted to rely on the Court's prior ruling in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation 151 to support the Internet indecency regulations, arguing that
the Internet invaded the home in the same way broadcast television did.
The Court rejected that argument, relying on the district court's holding
that Internet communications do not appear on an individual's computer
"unbidden." 152 By the time the Court had decided the opinion, however,
the technology had changed and "push" technology had been developed
that requires no action from the user to receive information. 153 Similarly,
in Ashcroft v. ACLU, in which the Court considered, among other things,
the effectiveness of filtering technology, the Court noted that "the factual
record does not reflect current technological reality-a serious flaw in
any case involving the Internet." 154
Scholars have lively debates about what the Court should do in the
face of constantly changing technology. One possibility would be simply
not to take any cases that involve new technology, at least until things
have settled down and no substantial change is going to take place. This
avoidance approach can be frustrating for litigants, and in cases
involving arguments that a statute is unconstitutional, it can have the
effect of yielding too much power to the legislative branches. 155 In
addition, it is difficult to declare with any degree of certainty that a
certain type of technology will not change or develop in any meaningful
way in the future, or, perhaps more importantly, that the common use
and societal attitudes toward any particular technology will not continue
to change or develop. 156

148. !d. at 290-96 (discussing the changes in technology between the trial court decision and
the issuance of the Court's opinion).
149. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
150. Benjamin, supra note 147,at291-92.
151. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
152. Benjamin, supra note 147, at 293.
153. !d.
154. 542 U.S. 656,671 (2004).
155. Benjamin, supra note 147, at 309.
156. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010) (stating that it is
important to proceed cautiously in cases involving new technology given not only the potential for
changes in the technology but also the social norms relating to that technology).
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As much as we might want resolution of new legal issues, early
intervention from the Court might result in decisions based on imperfect
understanding of the communications environment. Waiting for the
technology to develop, for cultural understandings regarding that
technology to take root, and for the lower courts to weigh in with their
views is prudent. 157 Furthermore, as Lyrissa Lidsky points out in her
essay for this Symposium, new media might be better off without the
Court's intervention. 158 In addition, in all areas of the law the Court
wants to be sure that when it grants a petition for certiorari, the case is a
good "vehicle" for deciding the issues that have divided the lower courts.
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, regardless of whether
the Court's avoidance approach is justifiable, there can be no doubt that
the Court is very cautious about taking cases that involve new
technology.

B. Oral Argument
Journalists and bloggers have often poked fun at the Justices for their
questions during oral arguments in cases regarding technology. Because
oral argument is largely unscripted, it is not surprising that the public has
a chance to get a glimpse of the Justices' true feelings for and
understanding of technology.
The Justices were somewhat recently ridiculed about the questions
they asked during oral argument in City of Ontario v. Quon, 159 which
addressed whether a police department violated its employee's privacy
rights when it examined personal text messages sent from a device
owned by the department. 160 In the case, Sergeant Jeff Quon and three
other plaintiffs, including his wife and mistress, were employed with the
Ontario police department and sued the Chief of Police for reading
sexually explicit messages that were sent via pagers provided by the
department.

157. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path oj'Cvherlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1752 (1995) ("[The
Court] should do everything it can to stand back from deciding these conflicts until the nature of
these conflicts is well mapped, well constructed, well understood.").
158. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Nota Free Press Court, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819.
159. See, e.g., Toby Hamden, US Supreme Court Needs Technology Tuition, TELEGRAPH
(Apr. 22, 2010,
12:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/
usa/7617031/US-Supreme-Court-needs-technology-tuition.html.
160. Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 19,2010,5:56
PM), http://b1ogs.wsj .com/1aw/20 I 0/04/19/our-tech-savvy-supreme-court.
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During oral argument, the Justices asked a number of questions that
appeared to reveal their struggle to understand the technology at issue.
For example, Chief Justice John Roberts asked what the difference was
"between a pager and e-mail." 161 In his defense, his question may have
been directed at determining whether a workplace policy that protected
the privacy of an employee's e-mails would also encompass a right of
privacy for messages sent on pagers. 162
Other questions the Justices asked are less easily explained. Chief
Justice Roberts asked what would happen if a text message was sent to
an officer at the same time he was sending one to someone else: "[D]oes
the one kind of trump the other, or do they get a busy signal?" 163 In
addition, Roberts stated that he would not have known about the role of a
service provider routing the messages from the sender to the recipient: "I
wouldn't think that [some company was going to have to process the
message]. I thought, you know, you push a button; it goes straight to the
other thing." 164 Justice Scalia-perhaps simply attempting to get a
laugh-echoed the Chiefs comment and remarked, "You mean it
doesn't go right to the other thing?" 165 Shortly thereafter Justice Scalia
made another comment that may have been a joke-or may indicate his
. spicy
unfamiliarity with pagers: "Could Quon print these .
conversations out and circulate them among his buddies?" 166
Notably, the Justices were not the only ones who seemed to struggle
to understand the technology at issue in Quon. Dieter Dammeier, the
lawyer for police officer Quon, stumbled when he was asked whether the
officers had any ability to delete the messages permanently after they had
been sent so that the police department would not be able to retrieve
them later from the wireless carrier. At first, when Justice Alita asked
161. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (No. 08-1332),
http://www. su premecourt. govI oral_argumen ts/ argument_transcri pts/08 -13 32. pdf.
162. That said, Chief Justice Roberts has made other comments at oral argument that reveal
his discomfort with new technology. Although this Article does not address the Court's
understanding of technology in patent cases, it is worth noting that in one patent case, Chief Justice
Roberts asked, "If you punched in in [sic] your search station, you know, give me all the bakers in
Washington, would that be patentable?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct.
3218
(2010)
(No.
08-964),
http://www.supremecourt.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-964.pdf. It is unclear whether he intended to say "search
engine" instead of "search station." Because Chief Justice Roberts does not use his computer for
word processing, it is entirely possible that he regards his computer as a "search station."
163. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 44.
164. !d. at 49.
165. !d.
166. ld
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him whether an officer can delete messages so that they cannot be
recovered, the lawyer responded, "Sure. Yes .... They can delete them.
Just like if they received a letter, they could be put in the shredder." 167
When Justice Alito asked him a few moments later whether he was sure
about whether officers could delete the messages permanently,
Dammeier admitted, "Honestly, I'm not-that's not in the record, and
the-how that pager works as far as deleting, I couldn't be certain that it
would be deleted forever." 16 8
The Justices have asked memorable questions in various other cases
that reveal their lack of experience with technology. For example, in a
recent violent video game case, Justice Kennedy asked the California
Attorney General why V-chips would not be sufficient to give parents
the ability to control what violent video games their children play. 169
The lawyer correctly responded that "the V-chip is limited to
television." 170 Justice Kennedy was also ridiculed when he indicated in
the Citizens United oral argument that Kindle readers received their
content from satellites (rather than wireless cellular networks). 171 In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Justice Souter
admitted that he did not use an iPod, but he nevertheless revealed he was
well aware how that device could be put to legitimate-and
illegitimate-uses:
I may not understand what people are doing out there, but it's certainly
not clear to me. I know perfectly well I could go out and buy a CD and
put it on my iPod, but I also know perfectly well that if I can get the
music on the iPod without buying the CD, that's what I'm going to do.
And I think it's reasonable to suppose that everyone else would guess
that. 172

It is clear that at least some of the Justices carefully read the

167. /d. at 51.
168. !d. at 53.
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(20 II) (No. 08-1448), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ transcripts/081448.pdf.
170. !d.
171. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876 (201 0) (No. 08-205), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument _transcripts/08205.pdf.
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
U.S.
913
(2005)
(No.
04-480),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments
545
/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf.
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advocates' briefs and lower court opinions when they are trying to
understand the communications medium under consideration. In the
recent violent video games case, Justice Kagan asked the Attorney
General for California, who was arguing that the state's restrictions on
the sale of certain violent video games to minors was constitutional, what
other violent video games would be covered under the statute because
the only game explicitly mentioned in the California brief was "Postal
2." 173 In that same case, ChiefJustice Roberts noted in the oral argument
that some violent video games involve "people actively hitting
schoolgirls over the head with a shovel so they'll beg with mercy, being
merciless and decapitating them, shooting people in the leg so they fall
down-I'm reading from the district court description-pour gasoline
over them, set them on fire, and urinate on them." 174
The public's expectations for the Justices' understanding of new
technology are so low that when any of them demonstrates that they "get
it," the media covering the Court goes crazy. Perhaps the best example of
this came in the violent video game case, where Justice Kagan got a
laugh out of a crowd and significant media attention 175 when she asked
the California Attorney General whether the statute at issue would cover
Mortal Kombat, adding that it is "an iconic game, which I'm sure half of
the clerks who work for us spent considerable amounts of time in their
adolescence playing." 176 Shockingly, the lawyer responded that he was
not very familiar with that particular game. 177 Oral argument attendees
and the press also enjoyed Justice Scalia's resistance to California's
arguments, where he was quick to respond to the argument that the
statute covered only "deviant" video games-"As opposed to what? A
normal violent video game?'' he asked. 178 In addition, Justice Scalia
contended at oral argument that California was making the same
argument-that depictions of violence are somehow worse than ever
before and therefore entitled to less First Amendment protection-that
comes up whenever there is new technology. 17 9
173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 12.
174. /d.at33.
175. See Joan Biskupic, Kagan Offers Practicality to Arguments, Settles in as New Justice,
USA TODAY (Nov. 16,2010,6:25 PM), http://usat.ly/Wn!NOg; Nina Totenberg, The Robe Seems to
Suit
New
Justice
Kagan,
NPR
(Dec.
27,
2010,
12:01
AM),
http://www.npr.org/20 I 0/12/27/1321 09642/the-robe-seems-to-suit-new-justice-kagan.
176. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 58-59.
177. /d.at59.
178. /d. at 4.
179. /d. at 7-8.
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In perhaps the most entertaining oral argument in recent memory, the
Court considered whether the FCC's ban on fleeting expletives in
broadcast media was constitutional despite dramatic changes in
communications technology since the Court's Pacifica decision in 1973.
Justice Kennedy asked Solicitor General Don Verilli whether he was
arguing that it is still important to have a small segment of the media that
is not "vulgar," even though most people do not know which channels
are cable and which are broadcast. 180 Justice Kennedy also noted that the
V-Chip was not sufficient to protect children from indecency, stating
"And, of course, you ask your 15-year-old, or your 10-year-old, how to
tum off the chip. They're the only ones that know how to do it." 181
Justice Ginsburg provided a reality check about minors' exposure to
vulgarity: "I think that children-that children are not going to be
shocked by [expletives] the way they might have been a generation ago"
because they are hearing them on the street, from their big brothers. 182
They are "in common parlance today." 183 Even Justice Alito was aware
of how broadcast television had changed: "Well, broadcast TV is ...
living on borrowed time. It's not going to be long before it goes the way
of vinyl records and eight-track tapes." 184
The Justices have frequently expressed their concerns about the
capabilities of new technology in cases involving Fourth Amendment
challenges. The oral argument in United States v. Jones illustrated these
concerns most dramatically (and the various published opinions in the
case, discussed below, reflected their unease). There, in a case
challenging the constitutionality of GPS monitoring of a criminal suspect
where George Orwell's 1984 was mentioned at least six times, the farreaching potential for intrusive monitoring gradually dawned on the
Justices. Early in the argument, the Justices seemed horrified to hear the
lawyer for the United States concede that under his theory of the case,
the government could install GPS devices on the Justices' vehicles to
track their movements. 185 After the government lawyer explained what
180. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307
(20 12) (No. I 0-1293 ), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tra nscripts/ I 01293.pdf("Just because it's an important symbol for our society that we aspire to a culture that's not
vulgar in-in a very small segment?").
181. !d. at 19.
182. !d. at 23.
183. !d.
184. !d. at 32.
185. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No.
I 0--1259), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ I 012 59.pdf.
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information a GPS collects, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern about
the ability to detennine whether someone was speeding with a click of
the mouse. 186 Justice Breyer pressured the government to address his
concerns about "what would a democratic society look like" if the
government were tracking its citizens every hour of the day. 187 When the
government's lawyer responded that the Court should put off for another
day consideration of "the so-called 1984 scenarios" like the one Justice
Breyer offered, Justice Sotomayor interrupted him to note that the
potential for such monitoring was already there. 188 She explained that
the cost of GPS units is relatively low, and that many cars today already
come with GPS installed. 189
The Justices also asked the defendant's lawyer some difficult
questions about how to articulate his standard in light of the current and
future state of technology. For example, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan
asked the lawyer to distinguish GPS units from surveillance cameras,
against which his client would have no Fourth Amendment defense. 190
With some hesitation, Justice Kagan noted that in London, "I'm toldmaybe this is wrong, but I'm told" the police can piece together pictures
from surveillance cameras and track someone's movements. 191 (Justice
Kennedy pursued a similar line of questioning but instead referred to the
traffic cameras mounted at intersections through this country. 192 )
Unmoved by the respondent's frequent urging that the Court decide
the case on narrow trespass grounds, Justice Kagan asked him how the
Court should deal with GPS surveillance that does not involve a physical
trespass but instead relies on the GPS system installed in the car. 193
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor pressed the lawyer to provide a legal rule
that would address not just the case before the court but also the nearfuture capabilities of surveillance technology. 194 This time she noted the
ability of satellites to "hone in on your home on a block in a
neighborhood" and how it is not far off into the future when these

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

!d.
!d.
!d.
/d.

at 22-23.
at 24.
at 25.
at 25-26.

!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.

at 36.
at 47.
at 46.
at 39-40.
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satellites will be capable of tracking people's movements. 195 Even
Justice Alito took part in the what-about-the-future game with a specific
reference to communications technology. He asked the respondent about
the reasonable expectation of privacy ten years from now when "90
percent of the population will be using social networking sites, and they
will have on average 500 friends, and they will have allowed their
friends to monitor their location 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, through
the use of their cell phones." 196
As they did in Jones, the Justices commonly use oral argument as a
time to learn more about the relevant technology from the advocates as
well as to explore the ramifications any ruling they might issue will have.
For example, in Kyllo v. United States, a Fourth Amendment cases
involving thermal imaging of a house, the Justices asked several
questions about how thermal imaging works, what information it can
collect, and how that information differs from the information available
from utility records or from that which might be available without the
use of technology. 197 These types of questions indicate that lawyers
appearing before the Court play an important role in educating the
Justices about technology.

C. Cases the Court Has Decided
The Court has struggled to determine how to deal with the novel
issues new technology raises. In case after case involving new
technology, the Court has tended to proceed cautiously. 198 In Fourth
Amendment, copyright, and telecommunications cases, the Court tends
to make narrow decisions, expressing concerns about their inability to
predict how technology-and its corresponding markets-will evolve
and the need to defer to the political branches. In many of its First
Amendment cases outside of the telecommunications context, the

195. !d. at 39.
196. !d. at 44.
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 10, 16--17,23-24,28-29,30, 32-33, 52-53, Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-8508.pdf.
198. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) ("[T]he judiciary risks error
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its
role in society has become clear."); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 778 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that given the fast-changing nature of
telecommunications, the judiciary might be well-advised to heed the proposition: "First, do no harm"
(quoting the Hippocratic oath)).
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Court's caution takes a different form; the Court generally (with some
notable exceptions) resists calls to revisit its foundational jurisprudential
principles in the face of new technology, and in the face of technological
uncertainty, favors speech and eschews deference to the political
branches.
The important thing to note about the Court's decisions, however, is
that while they reveal some doctrinal confusion about how to deal with
new technology, they tend to reveal a solid understanding of the
technology at issue. Of course, the depth of this understanding can vary
within a single case, where the majority, for example, seems to have a
solid grip on the technology whereas a concurring or dissenting Justice
might not. But overall, the Court's decisions involving new technology
tend to indicate that the Court is perfectly capable of learning about
technology when it needs to do so.
1. Fourth Amendment

Much ink has been spilled about what to make of the Court's
patchwork of decisions involving the Fourth Amendment and new
technology. Most scholars agree that the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is a mess, although they disagree about whether changing
technology is the cause of this mess.
Fourth Amendment questions involving new technology pose classic
problems of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars have argued that
the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to searches carried out
with the use of technology because the Fourth Amendment cannot be
interpreted to "evolve" the same way technology can without departing
dramatically from the intent of the founders. 199 Justice Black famously
took this approach in his dissent in Katz, where he refused to go along
with this majority's more expansive interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, arguing that it is not "the proper role of this Court to
rewrite the Amendment in order 'to bring it into harmony with the
times. "' 200
Orin Kerr recently argued the Court's "messy" Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence can be explained best through a theory of "equilibrium
adjustment." 201 He argues that the Court has created its incoherent body

199. David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2007).
200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
20 I. Kerr, supra note 13.
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of Fourth Amendment decisions by reacting to changes in technology or
social practice that effect the privacy "status quo." In other words, if
changes make it easier for the government to obtain evidence (thereby
cutting into individual's privacy), it issues decisions restricting that
practice or the use of that evidence. But if changes make it harder, it
reaches decisions that tend to restore the government's power to obtain
evidence and prosecute crimes-at the expense of privacy. Whatever the
explanation, it is plain that technological changes have placed pressure
on the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and contributed to its
current state of incoherence.
Perhaps the most famous Fourth Amendment case involving new
technology is Katz v. United States, 202 in which the Court reversed its
prior holding in Olmstead v. United States 203 and held that the Fourth
Amendment protected against government wiretapping. 204 Notably,
Olmstead itself was decided fifty years after the invention of the
telephone; the technology was almost one-hundred years old by the time
of the Katz decision. The Court was able to reach its ultimate conclusion
only by jettisoning its traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment,
which required a physical trespass or seizure. The majority took pains to
note the importance of extending the Fourth Amendment to cover this
new technology: "[T]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." 205 Justice Harlan's famous concurrence offered the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" framework that has since become so
important to the Court's Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. 206 The Court
has cited Katz's reversal of Olmstead as an object lesson justifying a
cautious approach to cases involving new technology. 207

202. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
203. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 ( 1928).
204. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
205. !d. at 352.
206. /d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth a "twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable"').
207. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,2629-30 (2010) (citing Olmstead and
Katz to support the proposition that "[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear").
Ironically, Katz itself may rely on a now-outdated understanding of the importance of the technology
at issue in that case. These days, few people use public telephones; instead, the use of mobile phones
is widespread. See Benj Edwards, 10 Victims of Recent Tech, PCMAG.COM (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/261 0 35/the-1 0-victims-of-recent-tech/ I.
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The Court has been most aggressive with its Fourth Amendment
analysis in cases involving new technology that permits government
agents to discover information within the interior of the home. The best
example of this tendency is Kyllo v. United States, in which the Court
held that the use of thermal imaging constituted a search. 208 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia stated that "[w]here the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that previously would have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unconstitutional without
a warrant." 209
Scalia signaled the limited nature of the decision by repeatedly
emphasizing that the technology at issue in the case was "not in general
use." 210 This obvious hedging revealed the Court's concern that over
time the public's understanding regarding the reasonable expectation of
privacy could change along with the technology. Indeed, the Court has
curbed the protections of the Fourth Amendment based on questionable
assumptions regarding what technology is in general use or what the
social norms surrounding the technology are. For example, the Court
held in California v. Ciraolo that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
a backyard from warrantless surveillance from an airplane, 211 even
though it is hard to imagine that most people have any sort of expectation
that their backyards would be subject to an aerial-and warrantlesssearch at any time.
In his Kyllo dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for making
the case more difficult than it had to be. Stevens contended that "[t]here
is no need for the Court to craft a new rule to decide this case." 212
Instead, he argued, the case could be resolved simply by distinguishing
between surveillance inside the home and surveillance outside the
home. 213 Stevens criticized the majority for not focusing more narrowly
on the technology at issue in the case and attempting to "craft an allencompassing rule for the future," arguing that the Court should let the
legislature grapple with these issues rather than "shackle them with
prematurely devised constitutional constraints." 214

20S.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (200 I).
/d. at 40.
/d.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
/d.at42.
!d. at 51.
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Generally speaking, the Court has followed Justice Stevens's
admonition to be cautious in Fourth Amendment cases involving new
technology. One of the most recent examples of this cautious approach is
City of Ontario v. Quon, which addressed the Fourth Amendment
implications of government surveillance of electronic equipment used by
its employees. 215 The Court stated that it "must proceed with care"
because "[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear." 216 The Court was concerned that the
expectation of privacy that employees reasonably had in their use of
electronic devices was still evolving; in addition, the Court claimed that a
narrow holding was appropriate because a broad holding "might have
implications for future cases that cannot be predicted." 217 Critics
attacked the Court for taking such a cautious approach to the technology
at issue in the case, arguing that the social norms relating to pagerswhich have been around for decades-as well as text messaging are
already sufficiently developed for the Court to resolve whether the
Fourth Amendment offers any protection for such communications sent
or received on government-issued devices. 218 Furthermore, critics have
pointed out that the Court's narrow ruling failed to provide any
meaningful guidance to employers, employees, the police, and lower
courts. 219 Justice Scalia's concurrence in Quon branded the Court's
narrow approach to the Fourth Amendment implications of electronic
surveillance as "indefensible" because "[t]he-times-they-are-a-changin'
is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty." 220
In United States v. Jones, the GPS case, the Court likewise issued a
frustratingly narrow opinion that left open many more questions than it
answered. 221 Rather than decide the case based on whether the GPS
surveillance offended the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy,
Justice Scalia's majority opinion was based on the pre-Katz basis for
Fourth Amendment violations that depended on some trespass on the
215. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
216. !d. at2629.
217. !d. at 2630.
218. I. Fourth Amendment-Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 185
(2010).
219. See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Legal Limbo: The Supreme Court's Discomfim with
Technology in City of Ontario v. Quon Caused It to Confuse the Definition of a Fourth Amendment
Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 61, 82 (2011 ).
220. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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defendant's property. 222 Scalia contended that Katz's reasonable
expectation of privacy test supplemented rather than added to the
traditional property-based approach. 223 Justice Ali to's concurring
opinion took issue with Scalia's focus on finding a late eighteenthcentury analog to GPS tracking, offering the following humorous
footnote: "The Court suggests that something like this might have
occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a
very tiny constable, or both-not to mention a constable with incredible
fortitude and patience." 224 Justice Scalia's focus on the trespass on
property rights left open many important questions that seemed to
concern the Court in oral argument, including the constitutionality of
obtaining data from a factory-installed GPS device or from cellphones.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones expressed particular
concern about how the Court would approach such future cases,
especially given the Court's prior holdings that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect information given to third parties. She suggested that in
the future the Court might find it "necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties" because in the digital
age, "people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks." 225 Even Justice
Alito wrote a separate opinion expressing concern about the implications
for future cases. 226
Scholars have debated whether the Court should proceed cautiously
in the face of new technology. Orrin Kerr, for example, has argued that
Congress is in a better position than the courts to generate "rules of
criminal procedure when technology is changing rapidly" because
"Congress can legislate comprehensively, updating rules when
technology changes." 227 Kerr contends that whereas Congress can also
enact clearer rules, solicit expert input, act when technology is still
current, and act without a case and controversy requirement, judges are

222. !d. at 949-53.
223. /d. at 950.
224. !d. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
225. !d. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
226. /d. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Court's decision "will
present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked").
227. Orin S. Kerr, Congress. the Courts. and New Technologies: A Response to Professor
Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 782-83 (2005); see also Kerr, supra note 140, at 802.
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more likely to misunderstand technological issues because they cannot
solicit outside input and will therefore not know if they have
misunderstood an issue until after the opinion has been released and
becomes binding law. 22 8
Daniel Solove has publicly disagreed with Kerr, arguing that there is
no reason to believe that Congress is in a better position than the courts
to handle technological issues and criticizing Kerr's approach as
requiring unwarranted deference to legislative bodies. 229 So love points
out that Congress's statutes often contain gaps and are out of date, and
that Congress often fails to act in important areas. 230 Solove argues that
"there is no reason ... to assume that the average legislator can better
understand technology than the average judge" and that judges are able
to understand technologies well enough to deliver thoughtful
opinions. 231 He contends that "[ e]xpert testimony or an amicus brief can
adequately explain technology to judges." 232
It is not the goal of this Article to resolve whether So love or Kerr has
the better argument. Instead, it is simply worth noting that in Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court has generally taken Kerr's cautious
approach to technology. The Court's Fourth Amendment decisions
illustrate that the difficulties the Court has resolving issues relating to
new technology appear to have as much-if not more-to do with
uncertainty about how to apply the Fourth Amendment to new
technology than with the Court's inability to understand the relevant
technology. That said, the Court as a whole is exceedingly modest about
its ability to predict the capabilities of new technology, frequently noting
the limitations of its holdings, and deciding cases as narrowly as
possible.

2.

Copyright cases

The Court's copyright cases involving new technology demonstrate
that however hazy the Court's understanding of technology was at oral
argument, by the time the opinions came out, the Justices had a very
solid understanding of the technology at issue and were careful to

228. Kerr, supra note 227, at 783.
229. Daniel J. Solovc, Fourth Amendment Cod((ication and Professor Kerr's Misguided Call
for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747,760-61 (2005).
230. !d. at 763 64.
231. /d.at771-72.
232. /d. at 772.
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provide ample breathing space for the technology to grow and develop in
the future.
Among the Court's copyright decisions, its opinions in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 233 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 234 are the two that showcased the Court's
commendable understanding of changing technologies. In Sony, the
copyright holders sued the manufacturer of videocassette recorders,
claiming that the manufacturer was contributorily liable for the
infringement that occurred when the owners taped copyrighted programs.
The Court held that the principal use of the VCR was "time-shifting,"
i.e., taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient time, which
the Court concluded was a fair, noninfringing use. 235 Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court established a commercially significant safe-harbor
for new technologies that facilitate private, noncommercial copying. 236
Notably, it was the well-known Luddite Justice Souter who wrote the
majority opinion in Groskter, and by all accounts he had a firm grip on
the technology at issue. 237 He competently described how peer-to-peer
networks function as well as the advantages of peer-to-peer networks
over other kinds of networks. Justice Souter mindfully attempted to
strike the right balance between innovation and copyright protection, 238
and several years later, it appears he succeeded. Although some have
criticized the Court for failing to provide a clear standard or test to define
inappropriate inducement, 239 it is clear that the Court's ruling has not

233. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
234. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
235. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454-56.
236. Pamela Samuelson. The Generativity ol Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property
Legacy ofJustice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. I 83 I, 1850 (2006).
237. See Kermit Roosevelt, Justice Cincinnatus, SLATE (May I, 2009, 7:00 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newLand_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/justice_cincinnatus.html
(noting that Souter's opinion in Grokster "won high praise from both the legal and high-tech
communities").
238. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937 ("We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from
trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and
unlawful potential.").
239. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers.fiJr Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. Ill, 129 (2010)
(arguing that Grokster failed to clarify existing law and is open to various interpretations itself);
Kent Schoen, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster: Unpredictability in Digital Copyright Law, 5 Nw.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156, 156-57 (2006) (criticizing the Grokster decision for targeting only
clearly advertised infringing intent, thus arming technological innovators with knowledge of how to
avoid liability in the future); John Borland, Supreme Court Rules Against File Swapping, CNET
NEWS (June 27, 2005 ), http://news.cnet.com/Supreme-Court-rules-against-file-swapping/21 00-
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stifled technological innovation-the pervasiveness of iPods, Kindles,
and other electronic devices and products that allow consumers to buy
and share copyrighted works are proof of this. Indeed, Justice Souter
seemed comfortable enough with the technology to insert some humor
into his decision, writing that peer-to-peer technology "has given . . .
users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though
their popularity has not been quantified." 240 In another zinger, Justice
Souter writes, "Users seeking Top 40 songs, for example, or the latest
release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than those
seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and Streamcast translated that
demand into dollars." 241
Although the Court's copyright decisions indicate that the Justices
have a good grasp on the relevant technology, the Court has revealed-as
it has tended to do in Fourth Amendment cases-a hesitancy to say any
more than necessary to resolve the case before it. In Sony, 242 for
example, the Court stated that it was reluctant to expand the protections
of copyright law without clear guidance from Congress because "[s]ound
policy, as well as history," demonstrate that "Congress has the
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology."243
Indeed, in his concurring opinion in the Groskter case, Justice Breyer
wholeheartedly signed on to Professor Kerr's view that the legislature is
better situated than the Court to deal with the varied permutations of
competing interests implicated by new technology. 244 He explained,
"Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about
present or future technological feasibility or commercial viability where
technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves
may radically disagree." 245
Perhaps most importantly, in copyright cases the Justices are wary of
how the market will change and develop in response to technological

1030_3-5764135.html.
240. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923.
241. !d. at 926. Modest Mouse is an indie rock band that was very popular when the case was
decided in 2005, and The Decameron is a fourteenth-century Italian work containing tales of wit,
practical jokes, and life lessons.
242. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
243. I d. at 431.
244. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring).
245. !d. at 958.
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developments. In Grokster, for example, the Court took care to explain
that "[ w]e are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on
regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with
lawful and unlawful potentia1." 246
3. First Amendment cases

The Court's approach to changing technology in First Amendment
cases reveals its struggle to determine whether it needs to revisit its
doctrinal approach to the constitutional issues presented in light of the
pressures new technology places on that doctrine.
On a few occasions, the Court has dodged some of the more
complicated questions new technology presents by construing the facts
narrowly or deciding the case on other grounds. For example, in Snyder
v. Phelps, the Court declined to include in their analysis the Westboro
Baptist Church's online denunciations of the Snyders, explaining that the
Snyders failed to preserve that issue in their cert petition. 247 In support of
its decision to exclude this material, the Court cited Quon, 248 clearly
indicating that the Court was looking for an excuse to avoid addressing
the tricky questions online expression raises. In Morse v. Frederick, the
Court avoided the question of what authority schools have over the
speech of their students occurring off school grounds-an issue that
frequently arises with online expression-by concluding that the student
was participating in a school-sanctioned event during school hours. 249 In
FCC v. Fox, the Court ducked the question of whether changes in
technology warranted reconsideration of the constitutionality of the
FCC's broadcast indecency regulations by holding that the application of
the regulations in that case violated the networks' due process rights. 250
The Supreme Court has a mixed record when it comes to questions
of whether new media is entitled to the same First Amendment
protections as the old. Historically, the Court has been more receptive to

246. !d. at 937 (majority opinion).
247. Snyderv. Phelps, 131 S.Ct.l207, 1214n.1 (2011).
248. !d. (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629-31). The portion of the Quon
opinion the Court cites has nothing to do with how to construe certiorari petitions but rather
discusses how the Court must "proceed with care" before addressing "the implications of new
technology before its role in society has become clear." See also id. at 1225 n.l5 (A1ito, J.,
dissenting) (taking issue with the Court's decision to avoid consideration of the "epic").
249. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,400-01 (2007).
250. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (noting that it was
unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the indecency policy).
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arguments that new technology should be treated differently. For
example, the Supreme Court originally held that the First Amendment
does not protect motion pictures. 251 (The Court later overruled that
decision. 252 ) Furthermore, the Court has adopted a less robust, mediumspecific First Amendment standard applied to broadcast radio and
television, evident in both Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 253 and
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 254
Furthermore, in some of its telecommunications cases, the Court has
often expressed reluctance to interfere with the findings and predictive
judgments on which Congress has based its legislation. For example, in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court majority stated that
"[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'courts must accord
substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress. "' 255 In
other telecommunications cases, the Court has said that it is appropriate
to defer to the FCC's judgment in cases involving subject matter that is
"technical, complex, and dynamic." 256
Indeed, the Court's concerns about technological change have led it
to proceed cautiously in the telecommunications context. In Denver Area
Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, for example,
the Court struggled to determine how to approach cable regulation. The
plurality-Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and
Souter-held that it was "unwise and unnecessary [to] definitively pick
one analogy or one specific set of words now," due to its awareness "of
the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial
structure related to telecommunications." 257 Justice Souter's separate
concurring opinion in that case echoed the same concerns, noting that in

251. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 ( 1915) (characterizing as
"wrong or strained" the argument that the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment
applied to motion pictures).
252. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
253. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
254. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 ( 1978).
255. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,665 (1994)).
256. Nat'! Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03
(2005); see also Nat'! Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002); Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("[T]he broadcast industry is
dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so
now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded I0 years hence.").
257. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996); see
also id. at 749 ("[W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which we have
developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new and changing area.").
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cases involving changing technology, "we should be shy about saying
the final word today about what will be accepted as reasonable
tomorrow." 258 He proclaimed that in the face of such change, "[the]
judicial obligation to shoulder [their judicial responsibilities] can itself be
captured by a much older rule, familiar to every doctor of medicine:
'First, do no harm."' 259 Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Ginsburg),
however, took issue with the plurality's deference to Congress in cases
involving emerging technologies. 260 He argued that it is not clear that the
Court minimizes harm when it chooses to uphold rather than strike down
legislation: "If the plurality is concerned about technology's direction, it
ought to begin by allowing speech, not suppressing it." 261 Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, also took
the plurality to task for avoiding the appropriate First Amendment
standard for cable operators. 262
The Court has more recently resisted the government's arguments for
less-stringent, medium-specific First Amendment protection for new
media and has refused to defer to legislative judgment in the face of
technological uncertainty. From "dial-a-porn" 263 and cable television 264
to the Internet, 265 "crush" videos, 266 and violent video games,2 67 the
Court has insisted on applying the full robust protections of the First
Amendment. In striking down statute after statute, the Court also has
shown increasing reluctance to defer to legislative judgment even in the
face of technological uncertainty. The majority position on the Court
appears to be that when there is any uncertainty about the future of the
technology, the balance tips in favor of speech. The Court has not shown
the same reluctance it has demonstrated in its Fourth Amendment cases
to issue broad rulings, but its First Amendment decisions are
nevertheless aptly described as cautious. The Court, as a whole, is not
willing to revisit its foundational jurisprudential principles in the face of
new technology.
258. /d. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
259. /d. at 778.
260. !d. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. !d.
262. !d. at 812~15 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
264. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
265. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
266. U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (20 I 0).
267. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2733--42 (2011) (applying traditional
First Amendment principles).
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It does not appear that any lack of understanding of technology has
led to the approach the Court has taken to First Amendment cases
involving new technology. The Court's first case involving speech on the
Internet-Reno v. ACLU-was decided fifteen years ago, when the
technology was in its infancy, and a panicky Congress had passed
legislation to protect children from pornography online. In order to
educate the Justices about this technology, the Court library ran training
sessions, and the law clerks helped teach their bosses. The government
urged the Court to treat the Internet the same way it had treated broadcast
television and radio in Pacifica, but it was Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, who refused to permit special rules to hamper public discourse
online. Indeed, one of Justice Stevens's law clerks from that term told
Tony Mauro that her Justice "was just as computer-savvy as we
were." 268 Justice Stevens's opinion, as well as Justice O'Connor's
separate opinion, conveyed a thorough understanding of the Internet as it
existed at that time. 269
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter again demonstrated a strong
understanding of how the Internet works in their respective dissenting
opinions in United States v. American Library Association, which upheld
a federal law that conditioned library funds on the use of Internet
filters. 270 Relying heavily on the findings of the district court, Justice
Stevens emphasized the many problems with Internet filters and the
availability of less restrictive alternatives. 271 Stevens took issue with the
plurality's conclusion that it would not be significantly burdensome to
require users to request access to a particular website or the disabling of
the filters, noting that in most cases a patron would not even know what
is being hidden from him. 272 Justice Souter's dissent echoed many of
Justice Stevens's concerns but also took pains to criticize the plurality's
claim that providing limited access to the Internet was equivalent to the
decisions libraries have to make selecting the books and other materials
to purchase. 273 He noted that "[a]t every significant
point ... the
Internet blocking here defies comparison to the process of acquisition";

268. Mauro, supra note 112.
269. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,849-53 (1997) (discussing the Internet); id. at 888-91
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the differences between
cyberspace and speech in "the physical world").
270. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
271. !d. at 221-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. !d. at 224.
273. !d. at 235-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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for example, a library does not have to be concerned about limited funds
or space when providing Internet access. 274
The Court's recent decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association is illustrative of the efforts the Court makes to understand
new technology. 275 Experts believe that the Court did a lot of research
about videogame technology. 276 The Justices' law clerks most likely also
played a role in citing games like Kill Screen and GameTrailers.com. 277
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts has publicly confirmed that the Justices
often do rely on their law clerks to help them understand new
technology: "That's one of the great things again with the law clerks.
They come in and they know how all of this stuff works and what it
means. And they are a resource for kind of educating those of us who are
a little bit behind the curve.'>27 8
At the same time, a close review of Justice Alita's concurring
opinion in Brown reveals that his understanding of violent video games
remained weak even after the opinion-writing process. For example, he
expressed horror that video games would be offered in 3D sometime "in
the near future," 279 even though some already do have 3D images and in
many ways are indistinguishable from movies. He also noted that
"[w ]bile the action in older games was often directed with buttons or a
joystick, players dictate the action in newer games by engaging in the
same motions that they desire a character in the game to perform.'' 280
Justice Alito may have been thinking about Wii-which at the current
time does not offer the sort of violent video games covered under the
California statute-and not about all of the video game consoles on the
market that come with buttons and joysticks. Justice Ali to's opinion also
refers to games that reenact the Columbine and Virginia Tech
shootings, 281 but these games are not mainstream games (they are
generally made by nonprofessionals), and they do not contain the sort of
realistic graphic images of concern to California.
274. !d. at 236.
275. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
276. Nick Summers, Supreme Court Turns Technophile, DAILY BEAST (June 28, 2011, 12:38
AM), http :1lwww. thedailybeast. com/artie les/20 11/06/28/supreme-court-video-game-decision-is-raretech-savvy-ruling.print.html.
277. Entm 't Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748.
278. A Conversation with Chief Justice Roberts (C-SPAN television broadcast June 25, 2011),
available at http://www.c-spanarchives.org/clip/1960788.
279. Entm 't Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring).
280. !d. at 2749.
281. /d.
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Perhaps more striking than its understanding of the technology at
issue in Brown was the majority's refusal to defer to the California
legislature's findings that violent video games are harmful for minors,
even though video game technology continues to evolve and the effect of
violent video games on children is currently unclear. 282 The Court's
broadly sweeping opinion in this case did not reveal the same sense of
cautious hedging routinely on display in the Court's Fourth Amendment
cases.

***
Cases involving new technology do not present easy answers and
often place pressure on the relevant pre-existing doctrinal framework; it
is therefore not surprising that the Court would struggle to understand the
technology in its efforts to understand how to rule. 283 The Justices are
pretty tech-savvy for baby boomers, and they seem to do their research
before they rule. If anything, the gap that appears to exist between the
Justices' understanding of technology at oral argument and in their
written decisions may indicate simply that advocates need to do a better
job of educating the Justices in the first instance so they do not need to
do so much outside research and rely so heavily on their law clerks.
IV. DISGUST FOR THE MODERN MEDIA CULTURE
Although the Court is cautious when it comes to new
communications technology, it does not appear that its lack of
understanding about technology is the reason why it does not permit
cameras in the courtroom. After all, at this point cameras hardly count as
"new" technology.
As the introduction to this Article mentioned, there are probably
many reasons why some of the individual Justices would prefer to limit
their exposure in the public eye. But surely one of them is the desire to

282. !d. at 2733-42 (majority opinion) (holding that video games, including violent video
games, are entitled to First Amendment protection). Of course, some members of the Court made the
typical arguments for a more cautious approach. See id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the
Court for failing to take a more cautious approach to new technology); see also id. at 2770 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should defer to the legislature, particularly in cases involving
technical matters).
283. As Chief Justice Roberts has quipped: "The impact of the new technology on substantive
law is really quite significant." A Conversation with ChiefJustice Roherts, supra note 278, at 40:25.
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keep the Supreme Court unsullied by the modem media culture. This
concern runs far deeper than mere vanity, although that may also play a
role. Justice Ginsburg gave a speech in July 2012 in which she collected
ten examples of amusing comments from oral arguments in the prior
Term and concluded, "From the foregoing samples, you may better
understand why the court does not plan to permit televising oral
arguments any time soon." 2 84
Various members of the Court have expressed doubt that cameras in
the courtroom would promote public understanding of how the Court
functions. Indeed, when Justice Alito was asked about cameras in 2007,
he said that he did not see why access to video was so important given
that the Court already provides transcripts and audio recordings. 285
Justice Scalia has said that few people would watch the oral arguments
gavel-to-gavel and instead would see only a thirty-second sound bite that
would give a distorted image of the proceedings. 286 He has also argued
that "there's something sick about making entertainment out of real
people's legal problems." 287 Retired Justice Souter said that when he had
been a judge in New Hampshire, camera coverage had affected his
behavior on the bench because he had believed that some questions
would be taken out of context on the evening news. The judiciary is not a
political institution, he said, "nor is it part of the entertainment
industry." 288 Justice Breyer remarked along the same lines, explaining
that one reason why there is tension between the Court and the press is
that the press "specializes in what is interesting" and seeks out cases
offering a human interest angle, while the Court "has no interest in being
interesting." 289
The Court has grappled with excessive media coverage in its own
cases and confirmation hearings. In Estes v. Texas 290 and Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 291 for example, the sensationalistic coverage of notorious

284. Liptak, supra note 2.
285. Tony Mauro, A/ito Reflects on His Role on the High Court, LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005488255.
286. De Vogue, supra note I.
287. Interview by Maria Bartiromo with Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
(Oct. II, 2005), available at http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id /9649724/ns/today/t/justice-scalia-saysnot-chance-cameras.
288. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, 'Over My Dead Body,' supra note 32.
289. Stephen Breyer, Communication Media and Its Relationship with Supreme Courts, 42 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1083, 1085-86 (1998).
290. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 ( 1965).
291. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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murder trials horrified the Court. 292 And the media coverage of the O.J.
Simpson trial was also widely criticized. 293 Justice Kennedy apparently
quipped soon after the trial, "I'm delighted I'm less famous than Judge
Ito." 294 The confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork and Clarence
Thomas also offended the Justices and even led retired Justice Thurgood
Marshall to withdraw his support of cameras in the courtroom. 295
Disgust with modem media culture was evident during oral argument
in the Court's most recent case addressing the FCC broadcast indecency
regulations. There, Justices Kennedy and Scalia discussed the "symbolic
value" of having broadcast channels free of expletives and nudity, and
the Chief Justice waxed fondly on the olden days when he said from
1927 to the mid-1970s there weren't any nudity or expletives on
television. 296 Chief Justice Roberts argued that the proliferation of cable
channels means that people have 800 other channels where they go can
for nudity and expletives. 297 Justice Ali to expressed concern about what
people would see on Fox if these guidelines were held
unconstitutional. 298 Justice Breyer noted that Fox was fined because two
young women "used a fleeting expletive which seems to be naturally part
of their vocabulary." 299 Justice Kennedy worried that striking down the
fleeting expletives regulation would cause more celebrities and wanna-be
celebrities to be free to use profanity, and broadcasters would come to
expect it "as a matter of course." 300 (Phillips responded that you would
see people using the language they normally use, which increasingly
includes vulgarity. 301 ) Justice Scalia helpfully suggested that in addition
to using "bleeping" technology and imposing a scienter requirement, a
third option for broadcasters is that they "shouldn't interview these
people" likely to use profanity. 302 In the opinion the Court ultimately
issued in the case, the Court made a subtle dig at the content at issue by
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Mauro, supra note 4, at 262.
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referring to a presenter at the Billboard Music Awards who used a
profanity as "a person named Nicole Ritchie." 303
Indeed, one of the real reasons the Court is hostile to cameras in the
courtroom may be precisely because it does understand all too well that
technology is powerful and unpredictable. Perhaps the Justices are
protecting themselves and the institution from misunderstandings that
would likely be created and cemented by video. It is not difficult to
imagine a remark, taken out of context, used over and over again to
impugn the court, argue for its weakening, or to foment fundamental
change (e.g., for elected judges or judicial term limits). If all we have is
written transcript, the visceral impact of the misperception is much
harder to create and maintain. The Justices may feel that it is better to
leave things as they are than run the risk of technology in the courtroom,
which is hard to control and unpredictable. In short, technology would
disrupt the Court's control over its perception by the public, and the
Justices do not want to lose that control.
Given what appears to be a Court concerned about how video will
pervert public understanding of the Court's functioning, we still may be a
long way off from having cameras in the courtroom. This hardly
suggests, however, that there are not other ways that the Court could use
to improve its communications with the public. This is not to minimize
the value of video, but it simply recognizes that there are other
potentially valuable ways of improving the way the Court interacts with
the public. Once we can focus on what alternative technologies would be
valuable, then the Bar and the press should undertake an effort to educate
the Court about these technologies, just as lawyers (ideally) do when
they are arguing cases with new technology before the Court.
Short of permitting cameras in the courtroom, there are a number of
other initiatives the Court could undertake that would not interfere with
the Court's ability to control its public image but would make it easier
for reporters to cover the Court and for the general public to understand
the Court's work. One obvious solution would be to make the audio of
the oral argument available immediately; better yet, the Court could offer
live streaming audio. Given that the Court already releases audio
recordings of its oral arguments, the only thing this suggestion would
change, if implemented, is the timing of these releases. Although
releasing audio the day of oral argument might increase the use of the
Justices' voices in media coverage of the cases under consideration, bare

303. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., !32 S. Ct. 2307, 2314 (2012).
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audio recordings-without accompanying video-are less valuable for
television broadcasts and, as a result, much less likely to lead to turning
the Court's work into the sort of "entertainment" in the way that the
Justices apparently fear.
In addition, the Court should release the audio recordings of the
opinion announcements immediately (again, live-streaming would be
preferable) and make them easily accessible on the Court's own website.
The Court could also improve the accessibility of its own website. At the
moment, the website lists cases by Term, and by case-name only. It
would be very helpful for the press and public alike if the website gave
some indication regarding the type of case, the question presented, and
the holding.
Advocates for increased public access to the Court's work should
urge the Court to harness the power of the social media. The first step is
to educate the Court that using social media does not mean that the
individual Justices need to start opening Facebook and Twitter accounts
to communicate on a daily basis for the public. Instead, the Court itself
could use various social media platforms to distribute the Court's
opinions and orders, oral argument transcripts, and oral argument audio.
The Court could also help improve press coverage in a number of
ways. For example, the Court could reinstitute its policy of e-mailing the
opinions to the press corps, particularly in high-profile cases, in case the
Court's website becomes inaccessible. Congress and the Court alike
should also carefully consider how it could revise its press access
policies to account for changes in the media environment. Although it
seems unlikely that the Court will give the press advance notice of which
opinions are coming down, the Court could continue to work on its
efforts to spread out the announcement of high-profile cases and to
refrain from announcing decisions on the same day as oral argument.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article took on the common argument that the Supreme Court
does not embrace the full range of communication media available
because it does not like, or does not understand, new technology. A
review of the Justices' personal use of technology, statements at oral
argument, and treatment of technology in written opinions reveals that
although the Justices are generally not technophiles, they are not hostile
to new technology but perhaps a little concerned about its impact. The
Court is generally cautious when it approaches issues involving new
technology, and this cautious attitude is reflected in its approach to using
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technology to communicate with the public. At the same time, it is clear
that the Justices are perfectly able to understand and appreciate
technology. This Article concludes that advocates for improved public
communications from the Court should move beyond its rather myopic
focus on cameras on the courtroom and consider educating the Court
about other ways in which the Court could improve its communications
with the press and public.
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